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JAMES MADISON, CITIZENS UNITED, AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OF
CORRUPTION
ANTHONY J. GAUGHAN*
One of the most controversial decisions in the modern history of the Supreme
Court is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. In a 5–4
ruling, the Supreme Court struck down the ban on corporate independent
expenditures. The majority defined corruption in narrow terms and held that
quid pro quo corruption was the only constitutionally permissible basis for
campaign finance regulation.
The decision set off a storm of outrage. President Obama even took the
remarkable step of condemning the ruling during his State of the Union
Address. Recent polls show that the public still overwhelmingly opposes the
majority’s ruling in Citizens United.
On the tenth anniversary of Citizens United, this Article puts the
constitutional problem of corruption in historical context by examining the
political career of James Madison. The Citizens United case turned on the
First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause. Madison wrote the First
Amendment while he served in Congress. He also played a key role in drafting
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thanks as well to my fellow panelists, Ellen Weintraub, Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, James
Sample, and Erin Chlopak, for their helpful comments. All errors of fact and
interpretation are my responsibility alone.
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the Constitution and in authoring the Federalist Papers, which explained and
defended the Constitution during the ratification debates.
Nearly two centuries after his death, Madison looms as large as ever in
American constitutional law. The Supreme Court still consults his writings
and career for guidance in interpreting the Constitution. Madison’s appeal
even transcends traditional divides, as justices across the ideological spectrum
routinely cite him.
The story of Madison’s political career thus brings a unique and important
perspective to the Citizens United ruling. The underlying issues of free
speech—as well as the threat of corruption posed by powerful financial interests—
were well-known to Madison. One of the most important constitutional theorists in
history, he was also a career politician, serving as a four-term member of Congress
and later as a two-term President of the United States. In addition, he helped
Thomas Jefferson found the Democratic-Republican Party (known today as the
Democratic Party), which meant that Madison spent his life not only as a public
intellectual but also as a practical politician engaged in party building. Madison’s
political experiences thus provide a revealing glimpse into how the First
Amendment’s author approached the issue of money in politics when it came to
his own election campaigns.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ....................................................................................... 1486
I. The Constitutional Problem of Corruption .......................... 1492
II. James Madison’s First Race .................................................... 1500
III. The Cost of Political Communication ................................... 1507
IV. Madison’s Broad Interpretation of the Right of
Free Speech ............................................................................ 1525
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 1538
INTRODUCTION
In January 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided the case
of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.1 A 5–4 majority held in
Citizens United that the government may not suppress political speech
on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.2 In striking down the

1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2. Id. at 365 (discussing § 441b (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012))
(“We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government
may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No
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federal ban on the use of general corporate treasury funds for
independent political expenditures,3 the majority identified the
congressional goal of banning quid pro quo corruption as the only
constitutionally permissible basis for campaign finance restrictions.4
The Court further concluded that “independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption
or the appearance of corruption” because they do not involve
coordination with candidates.5 Two months later in SpeechNOW.org v.
Federal Election Commission,6 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held
that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United,
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) could not enforce
contribution limits on independent expenditure groups.7 The era of
the Super PAC was born.8

sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or
for-profit corporations.”).
3. Id. at 357 (“Limits on independent expenditures, such as § 441b, have a
chilling effect extending well beyond the Government’s interest in preventing quid
pro quo corruption. The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the
speech here in question. Indeed, 26 States do not restrict independent expenditures
by for-profit corporations. The Government does not claim that these expenditures
have corrupted the political process in those States.”).
4. Id. at 359 (citations omitted) (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption . . . The fact that
speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that
these officials are corrupt . . . .”); see also SpeechNOW.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 692
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court has recognized only one interest sufficiently
important to outweigh the First Amendment interests implicated by contributions for
political speech: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.”). The
Supreme Court reinforced this conclusion four years later. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572
U.S. 185, 207 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“[W]hile preventing corruption or its
appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may target only a specific type of
corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”).
5. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
6. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
7. Id. at 692–93 (“[T]he government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting
independent expenditures.”).
8. Richard L. Hasen, The Decade of Citizens United, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2019, 5:50
AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/12/citizens-united-devastating-impa
ct-american-politics.html [https://perma.cc/U8WK-XZSH] (“After Citizens United,
courts and the Federal Election Commission issued decisions that led to the creation
of super PACs, political committees that spend money independent of candidates to
promote or oppose candidates for office.”). On Super PACs, see Richard Briffault,
Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2012).
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The Citizens United ruling generated immediate controversy.9 Critics
focused on the Supreme Court’s narrow definition of corruption,
which limited campaign finance regulation to corrupt bargains
between candidates and contributors (i.e., quid pro quo corruption).10
Under Citizens United, Congress may limit the amount of direct
contributions to candidates, but it may not restrict independent
campaign expenditures that wealthy individuals or outside groups make
without coordinating with candidates.11 Critics argued that the ruling
effectively put many forms of corruption outside the scope of regulation,
which in turn increased the influence of money in politics.12 A decade
later, the controversy over Citizens United still roils American politics.13
On the tenth anniversary of the Citizens United decision, this Article
puts the constitutional problem of corruption in historical context by
examining the political career of James Madison. The Citizens United
case turned on the First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause.14
Madison wrote the First Amendment while he served in Congress as a
Representative from Virginia.15 He also played a key role in drafting the
Constitution and in authoring the Federalist Papers, which explained and
defended the Constitution during the ratification debates.16

9. See infra Part II.
10. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359.
11. See Hasen, supra note 8. Super PACs “can take unlimited donations from
individuals, corporations, and labor unions. The legal rationale flowed directly from
Citizens United: If independent spending cannot corrupt, then contributions to fund
independent spending cannot corrupt either.” Id.
12. See id. (“The whole [concept] of Buckley and Citizens United is that
independent spending cannot corrupt because there can be no coordination with
candidates and therefore no opportunity for a quid pro quo. But in fact, thanks to
porous FEC rules, candidates and supportive super PACs can legally do just about
anything together, short of sitting down to plot a campaign advertising strategy.”).
13. For example, many Democratic presidential candidates in 2020 called for a
constitutional amendment overturning Citizens United. See, e.g., Alexander Burns, Seven
2020 Democrats Pledge to Focus First Bill on Fighting Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29/us/politics/end-citizens-united-pledge.html.
14. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
15. IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1800, at
255–65 (1950) (discussing Madison’s leading role in Congress and authorship of the
Bill of Rights); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718–19 n.5
(1971) (Black, J., concurring).
16. NOAH FELDMAN, THE THREE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON: GENIUS, PARTISAN,
PRESIDENT xi (2017) (“Madison devised the Constitution. . . . Then Madison set out
to convince the nation to ratify the constitution he had brought forth.”).
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Nearly two centuries after his death, Madison looms as large as ever
in American constitutional law. The Supreme Court still consults his
writings and career for guidance in interpreting the Constitution.17
Madison’s appeal even transcends traditional divides, as justices
across the ideological spectrum routinely cite him.18 In the 2016 case
of Evenwel v. Abbott,19 for instance, Justice Ginsburg cited Madison in
the majority opinion,20 and both Justice Thomas21 and Justice Alito22
cited Madison in their concurring opinions.23 The Court has also
scrutinized specific incidents during Madison’s political career for
evidence of how Americans interpreted the Constitution in the early
national period.24 For example, in the 2019 partisan redistricting case

17. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 866 (2014) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)) (“As James Madison explained, the
constitutional process in our ‘compound republic’ keeps power ‘divided between two
distinct governments.’”); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006)
(quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966)) (“But before we do so, we must find that the question is presented in a
‘case’ or ‘controversy’ that is, in James Madison’s words, ‘of a Judiciary Nature.’”).
18. See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
19. 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
20. Id. at 1127 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (James Madison)) (“‘It is a
fundamental principle of the proposed constitution,’ James Madison explained in
the Federalist Papers, ‘that as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the
several states, is to be . . . founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants; so, the
right of choosing this allotted number in each state, is to be exercised by such part of
the inhabitants, as the state itself may designate.’”).
21. Id. at 1138 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison)) (“Of particular concern for the Framers was the majority of people
violating the property rights of the minority. Madison observed that ‘the most
common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal
distribution of property.’”).
22. Id. at 1146 (Alito, J., concurring) (“That interpretation is confirmed by James
Madison’s summary of the same statement by Hamilton . . . .”).
23. Evenwel is far from unusual. See, e.g., Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2672 (2015) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 241
(Max Farrand ed., 1966)) (“As Madison urged, without the Elections Clause,
‘[w]henever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, they would take
care so to mould their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to
succeed.’”), and Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion, id. at 2681 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)) (“As James Madison
explained, the Senate would ‘derive its powers from the States,’ while the House
would ‘derive its powers from the people of America.’”).
24. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
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of Rucho v. Common Cause,25 the majority put great weight on the fact
that Patrick Henry attempted to gerrymander Madison out of a seat
in the House of Representatives.26
The story of Madison’s political career thus brings a unique and
important perspective to the Citizens United ruling. The underlying
issues of free speech—as well as the threat of corruption posed by
powerful financial interests—were well-known to Madison.27 One of
the most important constitutional theorists in history, he was also a
career politician, serving as a four-term member of Congress and
later as a two-term President of the United States.28 In addition, he
helped Thomas Jefferson found the Democratic-Republican Party
(known hereafter as the “Republican” Party),29 which meant Madison
spent his life not only as a public intellectual but also as a practical
politician engaged in party building.30 Madison’s political
experiences thus provide a revealing glimpse into how the First
Amendment’s author approached the issue of money in politics when
it came to his own election campaigns.
This Article reaches three principal conclusions. First, Madison
began his career wary of the influence of money in politics, but he
soon came to see campaign expenditures as essential to political
communication.31 Second, Madison promoted his political agenda by
building a network of partisan newspapers that served as propaganda

25. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
26. Id. at 2494. (“During the very first congressional elections, George
Washington and his Federalist allies accused Patrick Henry of trying to gerrymander
Virginia’s districts against their candidates—in particular James Madison, who
ultimately prevailed over fellow future President James Monroe.”).
27. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at xii (“Madison denounced Hamilton’s plans as a
blatantly unconstitutional attempt to shift power from the people to the capitalists.”); id.
at 599 (“Madison showed no inclination whatever to punish antiwar beliefs or sentiments”
because of his commitment to the First “amendment’s guarantee of free speech.”).
28. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES MADISON 1–2 (1990).
29. NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS: THE FORMATION
OF PARTY ORGANIZATION, 1789–1801, at 88 (1957); JULES WITCOVER, PARTY OF THE
PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE DEMOCRATS 26 (2003) (Jefferson’s Republican Party “came
to be known, in turn, as the Democratic-Republican and finally, later, the Democratic
Party. By some accounts, the original name ‘Republican’ was chosen out of sentiment
for the French Republicans and their own revolution”); see also David Brown,
Jeffersonian Ideology and the Second Party System, 62 THE HISTORIAN 17, 17–30 (1999).
30. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at xii (“With Jefferson, he formed the Republican
Party to counter the Federalist Party.”).
31. See infra Part II.
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vehicles; by creating a party organization that dramatically increased
the cost of elections; and by welcoming the participation of wealthy
campaign donors.32 Indeed, the expensive nature of American
campaigns dates back to the electioneering tactics first developed by
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and the party they founded. Third,
Madison took an unusually broad view of the First Amendment right of
freedom of expression.33 He believed that free speech rights should
take precedence even when the government had compelling reasons
to regulate or silence particular forms of speech.34 Moreover, the idea
advanced by Citizens United’s critics that a special First Amendment
protection exists for neutral, nonpartisan media organizations would
have seemed alien to Madison since no such organizations existed at the
time. In fact, he rejected the very idea of an independent press,
pointedly noting that the newspapers of his day were heavily influenced
by partisan as well as business considerations.35 Accordingly, during
Madison’s presidency, freedom of expression applied universally and
equally to all Americans, regardless of whether the speech emanated
from the media or the general public.36
There is of course no way of knowing with certainty how the author
of the First Amendment would have viewed the Citizens United ruling.
But the story of Madison’s political career reveals that he took a
pragmatic approach toward money in politics and a strict approach
toward free speech. Madison’s experiences as a candidate, party leader,
and officeholder thus demonstrate that the majority’s reasoning in
Citizens United has a much stronger constitutional foundation than the
ruling’s critics would suggest. Money may not be speech, but Madison
understood from personal experience that money is essential to effective
political communication. The right to free speech does not mean much
if the speaker lacks the means to disseminate the speech. The story of
Madison’s career illustrates that point. In the process, it shows that
money has played a crucial role in facilitating political
communication as far back as the eighteenth century.

32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at xiii, 599.
35. Id. at 423.
36. See id. at 599 (“Madison showed no inclination whatever to punish antiwar
beliefs or sentiments.”).
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION
The Citizens United case arose from a challenge to federal
restrictions on political activity by corporations and unions.37 Prior to
Citizens United, federal law barred the use of corporate and union
general treasury funds for making “direct contributions to candidates
or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a candidate.”38 In addition, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 200239 (BCRA) extended the ban to include a prohibition on the use of
corporate and union general treasury funds to pay for “any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication” that referred to a federal candidate
within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election.40
A nonprofit corporation called Citizens United challenged the law by
suing the Federal Election Commission in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.41 The dispute arose from a ninety-minute
documentary—Hillary: The Movie—that Citizens United produced to
undermine Hillary Clinton’s campaign for the 2008 Democratic
presidential nomination.42 Citizens United sought to air the documentary
through video-on-demand services in the 30 days before the 2008 New
Hampshire primary.43 However, the Federal Election Commission viewed
the movie as an illegal corporate-funded independent expenditure.44
Although most of Citizens United’s funds came from individual donors, a
small amount of its financial support came from for-profit corporations.45
Citizens United’s acceptance of donations from for-profit corporations
thus disqualified it from engaging in electioneering communications.46
37. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010).
38. Id. at 320.
39. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012)).
40. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321.
41. Id. at 321–22.
42. Id. at 319 (“In January 2008, Citizens United released a film entitled Hillary:
The Movie . . . It is a 90-minute documentary about then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who
was a candidate in the Democratic Party’s 2008 Presidential primary elections.”). The
film “depicts interviews with political commentators and other persons, most of them
quite critical of Senator Clinton.” Id. at 320, 325 (“[T]here is little doubt that the
thesis of the film is that she is unfit for the Presidency.”).
43. Id. at 321.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 319 (“Citizens United has an annual budget of about $12 million. Most
of its funds are from donations by individuals; but, in addition, it accepts a small
portion of its funds from for-profit corporations.”).
46. Id. at 327 (“Citizens United does not qualify for the MCFL exemption, however,
since some funds used to make the movie were donations from for-profit corporations.”).
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In a sharply divided 5–4 ruling, the Supreme Court sided with Citizens
United.47 The majority held that the federal ban on the use of general
treasury funds for independent expenditures made “political speech a
crime.”48 In invalidating the ban, the Court emphasized that while the
public might embrace or reject the contentions in Hillary: The Movie, the
Constitution did not permit the government to criminalize the film’s
broadcast.49 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted that “[t]he
civic discourse belongs to the people, and the Government may not
prescribe the means used to conduct it.”50
The most controversial aspect of the Court’s opinion was its holding
that corporations possess First Amendment rights like any other
speaker.51 Justice Kennedy asserted that “[b]oth history and logic”
indicated that the Constitution does not permit the Government to
“impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”52 An unconstitutional
effort to police speech struck the majority as the government’s true
motivation in banning corporate election activity. “Speech restrictions
based on the identity of the speaker,” Kennedy warned, “are all too often
simply a means to control content.”53 The regulation’s practical
implications particularly alarmed the majority. Justice Kennedy noted that
BCRA’s electioneering regulations outlawed Sierra Club advertisements,
National Rifle Association books, and American Civil Liberties Union
websites if they referred to a federal candidate before an election.54 Such
regulations, he warned, “are classic examples of censorship.”55
The Citizens United court rejected the government’s assertion that
the enormous financial power of corporations justified restrictions on
47. Id. at 372 (“The judgment of the District Court is reversed with respect to the
constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441b’s restrictions on corporate independent expenditures.”).
48. Id.
49. Id. (“Some members of the public might consider Hillary to be insightful and
instructive; some might find it to be neither high art nor a fair discussion on how to
set the Nation’s course; still others simply might suspend judgment on these points
but decide to think more about issues and candidates. Those choices and
assessments, however, are not for the Government to make.”).
50. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 341 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
51. Id. at 342 (“Under the rationale of these precedents, political speech does
not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a corporation.’”
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978))).
52. Id. at 341.
53. Id. at 340.
54. Id. at 337.
55. Id.
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corporate speech. Citizens United thus broke with a twenty-year-old
precedent. In a 1990 case called Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce,56 the Court had upheld a state ban on independent corporate
expenditures using general treasury funds.57 The Austin court warned of
“the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations” of
corporate wealth and held that “[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence
elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures.”58
But the Citizens United majority scornfully rejected Austin’s reasoning.
The antidistortion rationale, the majority asserted, could “produce the
dangerous, and unacceptable, consequence that Congress could ban
political speech of media corporations.”59 Although federal law
exempted media corporations from the corporate electioneering ban,
Justice Kennedy warned that “the largest media corporations have
‘immense aggregations of wealth,’” and “[t]hus, under the Government’s
reasoning, wealthy media corporations could have their voices diminished
to put them on par with other media entities.”60 The majority also did not
believe that the exemption for media corporations made sense in the first
place.61 The institutional press, Justice Kennedy insisted, does not have
“any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.”62
Technological changes, such as the rise of the internet, made the
distinction between the institutional press and other speakers untenable.63
Equally fatal in the majority’s view was the fact that the government’s
position would allow business corporations that owned media entities to
exercise free speech rights that other corporations did not have.64
As the majority saw it, “[t]he purpose and effect of this law is to
prevent corporations, including small and nonprofit corporations,
56. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
57. Id. at 668 (“Michigan identified as a serious danger the significant possibility
that corporate political expenditures will undermine the integrity of the political
process, and it has implemented a narrowly tailored solution to that problem.”).
58. Id. at 660.
59. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 351.
60. Id. at 351–52 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
61. Id. at 352 (“The media exemption discloses further difficulties with the law
now under consideration. There is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to
distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media
corporations and those which are not.”).
62. Id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
63. Id. (“With the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast
media, moreover, the line between the media and others who wish to comment on
political and social issues becomes far more blurred.”).
64. Id. at 352–53.
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from presenting both facts and opinions to the public.”65 The
majority concluded, therefore, that the law’s regulation of corporate
speech could not “be squared with the First Amendment.”66
The Court’s defense of corporate political speech set off a storm of
criticism. In a concurring opinion that dissented “emphatically”67 on
the corporate speech issue, Justice Stevens insisted that in the past
the Court had frequently “held that speech can be regulated
differentially on account of the speaker’s identity.”68 Rejecting “the
blanket rule that the majority espouses,” Stevens asserted that the
Court’s precedents “recognize that the Government’s interests may
be more or less compelling with respect to different classes of
speakers, and that the constitutional rights of certain categories of
speakers, in certain contexts, ‘are not automatically coextensive with
the rights’ that are normally accorded to members of our society.”69
The dissent saw no merit in the majority’s concern that a future
Congress might attempt to ban speech by media corporations.70 In a
footnote, Stevens observed that the “press might be able to claim
special First Amendment status.”71 In any case, the real threat in his
view came from unrestricted corporate political speech.72 In ominous
terms, he warned that the majority’s “ruling threaten[ed] to
undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation.”73

65. Id. at 355.
66. Id. at 353.
67. Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Id. at 420–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Yet in a
variety of contexts, we have held that speech can be regulated differentially on
account of the speaker’s identity, when identity is understood in categorical or
institutional terms. The Government routinely places special restrictions on the
speech rights of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners, and
its own employees. When such restrictions are justified by a legitimate governmental
interest, they do not necessarily raise constitutional problems.”).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 431 n.57.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 479 (“In a democratic society, the longstanding consensus on the need
to limit corporate campaign spending should outweigh the wooden application of
judge-made rules. . . . At bottom, the Court’s opinion is thus a rejection of the
common sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent
corporations from undermining self-government since the founding. . . . While
American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would have
thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics.”).
73. Id. at 396.
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The majority’s decision also generated extraordinary criticism from
the other branches of government and the public at large. President
Barack Obama condemned the decision during his 2010 State of the
Union Address74 and later called for a constitutional amendment to
overturn Citizens United.75 The ruling remains highly controversial. In
the 2020 campaign, the Democratic presidential candidates almost
universally condemned the Citizens United decision. For example, in
supporting the call for a constitutional amendment to reverse Citizens
United, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders declared that he would
make “clear that money is not speech and corporations are not
people.”76 The public overwhelmingly agrees with Sanders’s
sentiments. Public opinion surveys indicate Citizens United is one of
the most unpopular rulings in modern history. For example, a 2018
poll found that 75% of Americans support amending the
Constitution to reverse Citizens United.77 The polling data reflected the
widely held view that Citizens United represented a “hostile corporate
takeover of our democratic process.”78
Ironically, despite the fury over the corporate speech issue, the
Citizens United ruling has only had a modest impact on corporate
political spending. Ten years after the decision, relatively few
corporations engage in electioneering communications, and the
amounts barely move the needle.79 In fact, major corporations

74. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 28, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/politics/29scotus.html.
75. Andrew Prokop, President Obama: I’d Love a Constitutional Amendment to Reverse
Citizens United, VOX (Feb. 9, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/2/9/
7992489/obama-citizens-united-constitutional-amendment
[https://perma.cc/4DHD-VYV7].
76. Holly Otterbein, Sanders Unveils Plan to Stop Corporate Donations to Dem
Convention, POLITICO (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/
07/bernie-sanders-corporate-donations-dnc-036157 [https://perma.cc/7ZX8-68DF].
77. Ashley Balcerzak, Study: Most Americans Want to Kill ‘Citizens United’ with
Constitutional Amendment, PRI (May 10, 2018), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-0510/study-most-americans-want-kill-citizens-united-constitutional-amendment
[https://perma.cc/6NE4-NZVA].
78. Scott Castleton, It’s Time for Liberals to Get over Citizens United, VOX (May 7,
2018, 9:10 AM) (quoting Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro), https://www.vox.com/
the-big-idea/2018/5/7/17325486/citizens-united-money-politics-dark-moneyvouchers-primaries [https://perma.cc/TAC8-849C].
79. See Hasen, supra note 8 (“Looking at the amount of direct corporate spending in
elections over the past decade, one might think that Citizens United was a bust. Few forprofit corporations spend money in their own names boosting or dissing candidates.”).
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accounted for less than 5% of independent spending in 2018, which
itself only accounted for about 20% of total election spending.80
Although it is possible that some corporations may be using
nondisclosing 501(c) “dark money” groups to finance independent
expenditures, the fact remains that candidates and parties still
account for the lion’s share of campaign expenditures.
Instead, what made Citizens United so important was the fact that it
did not break new ground on a crucial issue: the constitutionally
permissible grounds for campaign finance regulation. Like the
majority in the landmark 1976 case, Buckley v. Valeo,81 the majority in
Citizens United declined to recognize any governmental interest other
than quid pro quo corruption—i.e., corrupt bargains between
contributors and candidates—as a valid basis for regulation.82 In cases
in the 1990s and 2000s, such as Austin, the Court had defined
corruption in broad terms and acknowledged other potential
constitutional justifications for regulation besides the anticorruption
interest. For example, in the 2003 case of McConnell v. FEC,83 the
Court recognized the Congressional goal of limiting donor access
and influence as a constitutionally permissible basis for campaign
finance regulation.84 But in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy rejected the
regulatory rationales accepted by the Austin and McConnell courts and
returned to Buckley’s single-minded focus on quid pro quo corruption.85 In
overturning Austin and rejecting the antidistortion rationale,86 Justice
Kennedy cited Buckley for the principle that the government has no
constitutionally permissible interest “in equalizing the relative ability of
80. Karl Evers-Hillstrom, In Hyperpartisan Political Environment, Major Corporations
Stay Away from Controversial Super PACs, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Apr. 12, 2019),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/04/major-corporations-stay-away-fromcontroversial-pacs20 [https://perma.cc/BF4J-XQ7Y].
81. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
82. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (rejecting the other
bases proffered by the government).
83. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
84. Id. at 154 (2003) (“It was not unwarranted for Congress to conclude that the
selling of access gives rise to the appearance of corruption. In sum, there is substantial
evidence to support Congress’ determination that large soft-money contributions to
national political parties give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption.”).
85. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”).
86. Id. at 365 (“Austin is overruled, so it provides no basis for allowing the
Government to limit corporate independent expenditures.”).
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individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.”87 As
Justice Kennedy emphasized, “[t]he First Amendment’s protections do
not depend on the speaker’s ‘financial ability to engage in public
discussion.’”88 Nor, in the majority’s view, did slowing “the skyrocketing
cost of political campaigns” represent a constitutionally permissible basis
for regulation.89 The Court emphasized that contributors’ special access
and influence with officeholders was not sufficient to justify restrictions
on independent expenditures. According to Justice Kennedy, “[t]he fact
that speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials
does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”90
Citizens United thus left viable only one regulatory interest: the
anticorruption interest.91 Moreover, by defining that interest narrowly
and applying it exclusively to quid pro quo corruption, the Court left
Congress and the FEC with very little regulatory room to maneuver.92
As Justice Kennedy put it, “[t]he absence of prearrangement and
coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not
only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but
also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro
quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”93
The Court thus concluded that the anticorruption interest was not
sufficient to sustain the government’s ban on corporate independent
expenditures because such expenditures did not involve coordination
with candidates.94 As Justice Kennedy explained, “[l]imits on independent
expenditures . . . have a chilling effect extending well beyond the
Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption.”95
The full ramifications of the Court’s decision became apparent two
months later. Applying the logic of Citizens United, the D.C. Circuit
barred the Federal Election Commission from imposing contribution
limits on all outside groups—not just corporations—engaged in

87. Id. at 350 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976)).
88. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49).
89. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26).
90. Id. at 359.
91. Id. at 357.
92. Id. (“The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here
in question.”).
93. Id. at 357 (Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47).
94. Id. (“[I]ndependent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do
not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”).
95. Id.
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independent expenditures.96 In SpeechNOW.org, the D.C. Circuit
observed that “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized only one interest
sufficiently important to outweigh the First Amendment interests
implicated by contributions for political speech: preventing corruption
or the appearance of corruption.”97 It further noted that in Citizens
United the Supreme Court held that independent expenditures do not
“lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.”98 The
D.C. Circuit thus concluded it had no option but to rule against the FEC
because the plaintiff, SpeechNOW, an independent expenditure group,
did not coordinate its activities with candidates.99 Writing for the circuit
court, Judge Sentelle explained that “[g]iven this analysis from Citizens
United, we must conclude that the government has no anti-corruption
interest in limiting contributions to an independent expenditure
group such as SpeechN[OW].”100
In the years since Citizens United, Super PACs and other outside
groups have spent at least $4.5 billion in state and federal elections.101
Nearly $1 billion of that figure has been spent by 501(c)
organizations that do not disclose their donors.102 Moreover, ten
families alone accounted for over $1 billion in expenditures.103 Not

96. SpeechNOW.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“In light of the
[Supreme] Court’s holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not
corrupt or create the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contributions to
groups that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the
appearance of corruption.”).
97. Id. at 692.
98. Id. at 694 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360).
99. Id. at 689 (SpeechNOW “intends to operate exclusively through
‘independent expenditures’”). The court elaborated:
Given this precedent, the only interest we may evaluate to determine
whether the government can justify contribution limits as applied to
SpeechN[OW] is the government’s anticorruption interest. Because of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC, the analysis is
straightforward. There, the Court held that the government has no anticorruption interest in limiting independent expenditures.
Id. at 692–93.
100. Id. at 695.
101. Karl Evers-Hillstrom, More Money, Less Transparency: A Decade Under Citizens
United, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.opensecrets.org/
news/reports/a-decade-under-citizens-united?utm_source=CRP+Mail+List&utm
_campaign [https://perma.cc/6ERK-JLQ6].
102. Id.
103. Id. (“The [ten] most generous donors and their spouses injected $1.2 billion
into federal elections over the last decade.” (emphasis omitted)).
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surprisingly, Citizens United has generated an enormous amount of
scholarship, most of which is critical of the ruling, particularly of the
majority’s narrow definition of corruption.104 The general public also
rejects the Supreme Court’s definition of corruption. A 2018 Pew
Research Center poll found that 77% of Americans support imposing
caps on the amount individuals and groups can spend on
campaigns.105
But is the post-Citizens United era as different from past eras as one
might think? A study of James Madison’s career suggests that the
campaign finance world he operated in—and helped create—bore
more similarities to our modern age than one might assume.
II. JAMES MADISON’S FIRST RACE
James Madison was born in 1751 to a wealthy family in Orange
County, Virginia.106 At the time of Madison’s birth, Virginia was a
colony in the British Empire. Although Parliament exercised ultimate
decision-making authority, the colonists nevertheless governed
themselves relatively independently.107 Americans thus conducted
elections throughout the colonial period.
104. For a small sampling of the academic literature on Citizens United, see
generally RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2016); Richard Briffault,
Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the
Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011); Michael S. Kang, The End of
Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1 (2012); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Deregulating
Corruption, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 471 (2019).
105. Bradley Jones, Most Americans Want to Limit Campaign Spending, Say Big Donors
Have Greater Political Influence, PEW RES. CTR. (May 8, 2018), https://www.pew
research.org/fact-tank/2018/05/08/most-americans-want-to-limit-campaign-spendingsay-big-donors-have-greater-political-influence [https://perma.cc/8RKV-9A9M].
106. IRVING BRANT, THE FOURTH PRESIDENT: A LIFE OF JAMES MADISON 3 (1970); RALPH
KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 6–7 (1971) (“He was of the substantial gentry, of
the three or four hundred families that throughout his lifetime dominated Virginia
politics and made such a large contribution to the public life of the new United States.”).
107. SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 7
(2005) (“The major claims on democracy’s behalf before the Revolution rested on
the rising power, in many colonies, of the lower houses of the colonial
legislatures . . . .”); W.L. Morton, The Local Executive in the British Empire 1763–1828, 78
ENG. HIST. REV. 436, 436 (July 1963) (“The colonies of Great Britain were selfgoverning from their foundation. As they grew in population and wealth their
powers of self-government grew correspondingly, except as they were checked by
royal instruction and parliamentary legislation. In time therefore colonial self-
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Surprisingly perhaps, money played a prominent role in colonial
elections. Private wealth influenced eighteenth century elections in
two ways. First, elected officials largely came from the upper ranks of
society, and in some colonies wealth was even a formal prerequisite
for office-holding.108 In South Carolina, for example, eligibility to
serve in the colonial legislature required ownership of at least 500
acres or ten slaves.109 Throughout the colonies, wealthy men of
property saw office-holding as both a privilege and an obligation of
their social class.110 As the historian Richard Beeman observed, the
practice of limiting colonial office-holding to the rich was intended “to
preserve the standing of the legislature as an exclusive body of men visibly
recognizable for their wealth and social prestige.”111 The assumption that
officeholders should come from privileged backgrounds persisted after
the Revolution.112 The framers of the Constitution—including James
Madison—hoped that the new Congress would be populated by the
upper classes.113 They envisioned a leadership class made up of
“gentlemen” educated at Harvard or Princeton and possessing “sufficient
wealth and independence that they did not have to earn a living in too
blatant or mercenary a fashion.”114
But money also influenced eighteenth century politics in a more
subtle way: the candidates’ practice of “treating” the electorate. Since
the earliest days of colonial politics, American voters expected
candidates for elective office to provide free alcohol at the polling

government was bound to come into conflict with imperial control, as it did after the
cession of Canada in 1763 in the clash of colonial and metropolitan legislative
authority aroused by the Stamp Act.”).
108. WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 7 (“[T]he legislators were generally out of touch
with their own constituents between elections, and ran their affairs much like the
oligarchies that commanded the early eighteenth century House of Commons under
Robert Walpole.”); see also RICHARD R. BEEMAN, THE VARIETIES OF POLITICAL
EXPERIENCE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 139 (2006).
109. BEEMAN, supra note 108, at 139.
110. WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 8; see GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 294 (1991) (noting that in the 1780s Americans finally began to abandon “the
age-old tradition that public office was the responsibility of a leisured patriciate”).
111. BEEMAN, supra note 108, at 139.
112. WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 8 (“Dependent men were politically unreliable
because they could be easily manipulated by their patrons.”).
113. Gordon S. Wood, Launching the Extended Republic: The Federalist Era, in
LAUNCHING THE EXTENDED REPUBLIC: THE FEDERALIST ERA 1, 15 (Ronald Hoffman &
Peter J. Albert eds., 1996).
114. Id.
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places on Election Day.115 The practice continued for decades after
the Revolution.116 By “treating” voters to vast quantities of beer, rum and
whiskey, candidates demonstrated both their affluence and publicspiritedness.117 As the historian W.J. Rorabaugh explained, “[t]he most
important facet of treating was never the dispensing of strong drink,
which was expected as a matter of course, but the manner and style of
dispensing it. The candidate had to demonstrate his generosity and
hospitality without a hint of stinginess or parsimony.”118
The practice of providing the voters with free alcohol was such an
entrenched feature of early American political life that candidates
who declined to participate faced almost certain defeat.119 The early
political career of George Washington was a case in point. In 1755,
Washington mounted his first campaign for the Virginia House of
Burgesses, the colonial legislature.120 But, in a sharp departure from
custom and practice, he refused to incur the expense of treating the
voters to free alcohol.121 The decision reflected his extremely stingy
approach to money.122 Although the scion of a distinguished family,
Washington grew up with little inheritance of his own.123 A deep
sense of financial insecurity haunted him, which was only allayed
when he married Martha Custis, the richest widow in Virginia.124 But
that marriage remained four years in the future in 1755. As a young
115. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 29–30 (tracing the roots of the American tradition
from English politics); see W.J. RORABAUGH, THE ALCOHOLIC REPUBLIC: AN AMERICAN
TRADITION 152 (1979) (“Another occasion when Americans drank was at elections,
when candidates were expected to treat the public, voters and nonvoters alike.
Treating at elections had been a colonial custom borrowed from England.”).
116. RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152 (“Such electoral practices did not change
significantly after the Revolution.”).
117. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 29–30; RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152, 154.
118. RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152.
119. Id.
120. RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 67 (2010) (“At the election in
Winchester on December 10, 1755, Washington was crushed by his two
opponents . . . .”); RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152.
121. RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152.
122. CHERNOW, supra note 120, at 107 (“Washington was congenitally prickly about
money . . . .”); cf. RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152.
123. CHERNOW, supra note 120, at 18 (“The following year, when George was fifteen, his
family underwent a period of extreme financial stringency that ended his education.”).
124. Id. at 79 (“By marrying Martha Dandridge Custis, Washington swiftly achieved
the social advancement for which he had struggled in the military. . . . Marriage to
Martha brought under his control a small kingdom of real estate . . . . She had a
bountiful collection of properties . . . .”).
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and novice candidate with few personal assets of his own, he showed
no interest in buying alcohol for voters.125
The decision backfired on him. Washington went down to a
surprising defeat in his first election,126 and he spent the next two
years fighting in the French and Indian War.127 He would never make
the same mistake again during his long political career. During the
1758 elections for the House of Burgesses, he bought and distributed
on Election Day 144 gallons of alcohol (some historians even place
the amount at 160 gallons), including everything from rum to wine,
an amount so generous he hoped it would persuade voters to forget
his blunder three years before.128 As Washington explained in a letter
to James Wood, his de facto campaign manager, “my only fear is that
you spent with too sparing a hand.”129
Washington need not have worried. The huge campaign
expenditure worked wonders, just as he had hoped it would. He
received over 300 votes, a tally sufficient to win the legislative seat.130
As W.J. Rorabaugh pointed out, “[f]or his 144 gallons of refreshment
he received 307 votes, a return on his investment of better than 2
votes per gallon.”131
Although the boozy spectacle of eighteenth century elections falls
far short of romanticized versions of the country’s democratic origins,
the candidates’ practice of “treating” the voters continued into the
nineteenth century.132 Candidates who broke with the tradition did so
at their peril, as James Madison would learn the hard way.
In April 1777, less than a year after the Declaration of
Independence, the Commonwealth of Virginia held its first
republican elections.133 Madison looked like a shoo-in to win a seat in
the new Virginia House of Delegates. A twenty-six-year-old Princeton
graduate from a prominent local family, he already had experience in

125. RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152.
126. Id.
127. CHERNOW, supra note 120, at 69, 91 (stating that Washington entered the war
in 1756 and resigned after taking Fort Duquesne in 1758).
128. Id. at 88; RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152.
129. RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 29 (“The elections for the Virginia assembly in April
1777 were the first republican elections in which Virginia’s citizens had ever participated.”).
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public office.134 In 1776, he had served as a delegate to the state
constitutional convention, where he made a mark as a thoughtful and
devoted public servant.135 When Virginia held its first republican
elections in 1777, Madison put his hat in the ring for a seat in the
House of Delegates.136
But there was just one problem: Madison refused to buy booze for
the electorate, just like Washington twenty-two years before.137 The
practice of wooing voters with alcohol struck young Madison as
incompatible with republican principles.138 In his view, the
“corrupting influence of spirituous liquors” undermined the integrity
of American elections.139 As Madison saw it, voters should cast their
ballots on the basis of the candidates’ personal qualities, not on the
amount of their campaign expenditures.
Despite the honorable nature of Madison’s decision, which was
fully consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of republican
ideology, his opposition to treating sunk his candidacy. Madison lost
the election to Charles Porter, a local tavern owner whose occupation
well-positioned him to meet voters’ Election Day expectations.140
Thus, like Washington before him, Madison learned that voters
expected candidates to spend money in seeking their votes.
But also like Washington, Madison was a quick study. As Noah
Feldman has pointed out, “[n]ever again would Madison fail to liquor
up the voters when he ran for office.”141 Madison’s experience
demonstrated the surprisingly expensive nature of politics during
America’s founding era. By requiring candidates to incur significant
financial costs to prove their commitment to the ordinary voter, the
practice of treating the voters weeded out those who lacked the funds
or inclination to make the customary expenditures.142
Not surprisingly, therefore, in the eighteenth century the majority
of officeholders came from the upper classes and thus could afford to
134. See id. at 6, 24, 28.
135. Id. at 24.
136. Id. at 28–29.
137. Id. at 29.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 30.
141. Id.; RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152.
142. See RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152–53 (noting it was “widely conceded” in
eighteenth and nineteenth century American politics that “liquor elected
incompetents and the lack of it defeated able men”).
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buy alcohol in bulk for the electorate. The idea of government by
independently wealthy officeholders was attractive because it meant
they were beholden to no one and, in theory at least, served solely on
behalf of the public interest.143 Accordingly, at the time of the
Revolution, conventional wisdom held that politicians should not
only pay for their own campaign expenses, but should also serve in
office without pay.144 Washington himself exemplified the republican
ideal of a self-sacrificing public servant.145 As commander-in-chief of
the Continental Army, he refused to accept a salary.146 Washington’s
contemporary Benjamin Franklin believed the republican ideal so
important that at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 he proposed
that executive branch officials should receive “no salary, stipend, Fee
or reward whatsoever for their services.”147
The democratization of American politics, however, rendered the old
republican ideal of self-financing aristocratic officeholders obsolete even
before the Constitution was adopted. As John Adams noted, if
officeholders received no salary, “all offices would be monopolized by
the rich, the poor and middling ranks would be excluded and an
aristocratic despotism would immediately follow.”148 The delegates
rejected Franklin’s proposal and the Constitution expressly authorized
Congress to set compensation levels for federal officeholders.149
As the historian Gordon Wood has explained, the defeat of such
proposals signaled that Americans had begun the process of
abandoning “the age-old tradition that public office was the
responsibility of a leisured patriciate.”150 Indeed, upwardly mobile
men from the “middling” classes increasingly won election to the

143. Wood, supra note 110, at 287 (describing how the rise of middle class
officeholders during the early national period “undermined the two-thousand-yearold classical tradition of aristocratic public service”).
144. Id. at 287 (“In an ideal republican world, government officeholders ought to
serve without salary. Receiving profits from a public office smacked of interestedness
and tainted the officeholder’s virtue.”).
145. See Garry Wills, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT
3, 9, 185–86 (1984).
146. Wood, supra note 110, at 289.
147. Id. at 291.
148. Id. at 289.
149. Id. at 291–92.
150. Id. at 294.
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state legislatures beginning in the 1780s.151 As Wood pointed out, “all
levels of government were steadily being democratized and occupied
by people with interests to promote.”152
James Madison recognized that the democratization of American
politics meant that new types of leaders would be elected. He did not
entirely welcome the change. He privately expressed the fear that
provincial local politicians would be elected to the First Congress.153
To curb the populist instincts of the general public, he considered
supporting a freehold suffrage requirement.154 But upon reflection
he realized that the Constitution would not be approved if it was
viewed solely as an instrument of political elites. Accordingly, in his
public remarks, Madison embraced the democratic spirit of the age.
In No. 39 of the Federalist Papers, he wrote that it was essential that the
new government “be derived from the great body of the society, not
from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it.”155
As the new republic democratized, it also polarized. The
ratification debates in the late 1780s and the partisan battles of the
1790s gave rise to an epic political communications war.
Communicating political messages over a large republic like the
United States required money. As the country grew, and as ordinary
people’s opinions and votes mattered like never before, campaign
costs grew accordingly. Madison found himself forced to choose a
pragmatic course. When he first ran for office in 1777, he feared that
the use of money in elections—such as paying for the voters’
alcohol—corrupted republican values. But practical realities led him
to increasingly rely on wealthy allies to help pay for his political
communication costs.

151. Wood, supra note 113, at 15–16, 18 (“[P]roperty qualifications for
participation in public life either as voters or officeholders lost their relevance and
rapidly fell away.”).
152. Id. at 15.
153. Id.
154. HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 89 n.14 (Murray Dry ed., 1981)
(“While James Madison initially favored some form of freehold suffrage requirement
as a way of checking the excesses of popular government, he later concluded that
such a restriction on the franchise was dubious both in practice and in principle.”).
155. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).
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III. THE COST OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
Like many Americans, James Madison feared that corrupt
officeholders would undermine democracy.156 The success of the
republic, he believed, depended on elected officials choosing to place
the public interest ahead of their own private and factional interests.157
During the Constitutional convention, he defined government
corruption not only as bribery but also as government policies that
promoted private ends at the expense of the public good.158 In
Federalist No. 57, he stressed that the Constitution’s framers sought to
promote the election of virtuous leaders who would “pursue, the
common good of the society.”159 The Constitution, he added, was
designed to establish “the most effectual precautions for keeping them
virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.”160
Along with his fear of self-interested factions, Madison worried
about the power of concentrated wealth.161 He opined, for example,
that the “power of all corporations ought to be limited” such that
they could not engage in “the indefinite accumulation of property.”162
But he also proposed giving Congress the power to charter
corporations during the Constitutional Convention in 1787.163
Although his fellow delegates declined the idea, Madison’s proposal
reflected his pragmatism. If corporations must exist, why not put
them under the authority of Congress?

156. RALPH KETCHAM, PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTY: THE FIRST AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 1789–
1829, at 31 (1984) (explaining fear that “domination of politics by private, special
interests would guarantee the triumph of the opposite of civic virtue—corruption”).
157. Id. at 114 (“Madison took seriously the concept of the public interest,
thought devotion to it was the critical mark of the good official, and saw a compelling
need for active, honest executives.”); see also id. at 118 (“To [Madison] a faction was a
group whose interests were ‘adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.’ Madison thus hoped that
factions would so check one another that a truly ‘aggregate’ view, an uncorrupted
policy, a public interest could be asserted.”).
158. Id. at 116 (“A good executive would have to be not only ‘separate’ from the
other branches but also protected as much as possible from corruption, which meant
to Madison not only dishonesty and intrigue but also, more fundamentally, pursuit of
private (partial) over public (common) interest.”).
159. THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (Madison).
160. KETCHAM, supra note 156, at 117.
161. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR
CIVIL RIGHTS 4 (2018).
162. Id. at 4.
163. Id. at 3.
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Madison’s pragmatism would become increasingly apparent during
his meteoric rise as both a constitutional theorist and an ambitious
politician. Although concentrated wealth alarmed republican thinkers
like Madison, he needed the support of wealthy private individuals to
circulate his ideas. In the end, therefore, the practical necessities of
using money to fund his political campaigns proved more compelling to
Madison than republican theories of political purity.
The Federalist Papers provided an early example of how money
proved essential to Madison’s political ambitions. In the months after
the Constitutional Convention, Madison joined with Alexander
Hamilton and John Jay in writing eighty-five essays in support of the
Constitution’s ratification.164 Historians, legal scholars, and judges
understandably and quite rightfully focus on the substance of the
essays. The Federalist Papers have become a source that even the
Supreme Court itself frequently consults to understand the intent of
the Constitution’s framers.165
But the Federalist Papers are important for another reason. They
illustrate that the effort to sway public opinion in favor of the
Constitution cost a significant amount of money.
The first series of Federalist essays appeared in New York City
newspapers in the fall of 1787 and early 1788.166 But Hamilton and
Madison knew that the Constitution’s ratification depended on more
than persuading readers in New York. It required the approval of
ratifying conventions in nine of the original thirteen states.167
Accordingly, Hamilton contracted with the publishers John and

164. Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the
Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2007).
Hamilton wrote fifty-one essays, Madison wrote twenty-nine essays, and Jay wrote five
essays. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 102 (1993).
165. See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1127 (2016); N.L.R.B. v. Noel
Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 523 (2014); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S.
334, 362 (1995); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806 (1995);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 539–40 (1969); see also RON CHERNOW,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 260 (2004) (“By the year 2000, [the Federalist Papers] had been
quoted no fewer than 291 times in Supreme Court opinions, with the frequency of
citations rising with the years.”).
166. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 246–47, 249; JOHN C. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON
AND THE GROWTH OF THE NEW NATION 188 (1959); Maggs, supra note 164, at 812.
167. U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States,
shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so
ratifying the Same.”).
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Archibald McLean to reprint the essays in a two-volume book.168 The
McLeans ultimately published 500 copies of the two-volume set.169
The publishers sent copies far beyond New York City, and Hamilton
specifically directed that fifty copies be sent to Richmond before the
vote of the Virginia ratifying convention.170 He and Madison also
mailed copies to allies in Pennsylvania.171
But the project resulted in enormous printing costs, far more than
Hamilton or the publisher expected. The original contract between
Hamilton and McLean called for the printing of twenty essays at the
cost of 30 pounds.172 But Hamilton and Madison ended up writing
over four times as many essays as anticipated, which meant that the
printing costs eventually reached 220 pounds.173 Dismayed by the
experience but still supportive of the Federalist cause, McLean
ultimately charged Hamilton a fee of 144 pounds in all, with the
publisher absorbing the remaining costs himself.174 It is unknown
whether Madison paid Hamilton back for any portion of the
publication costs, but it is possible that he did. He certainly could
afford it. A member of one of the Virginia gentry’s most prominent
families, Madison had a wealthy father and stood to inherit a large
estate.175 Interestingly, according to Virginia state records, the day
after publication of Madison’s last contribution to the Federalist Papers,
he was overdrawn on his state salary and expense account by 100
pounds.176 It is entirely possible that some of those expenses included
his share of the Federalist Papers’ publication costs.

168. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 248; Maggs, supra note 164, at 812–13.
169. Maggs, supra note 164, at 815.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 816.
172. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 248; MILLER, supra note 166, at 192.
173. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 248 (“The project’s magnitude mushroomed
tremendously from its origins. . . . Instead of one projected volume of two hundred
pages . . . The Federalist ended up running to two volumes of about six hundred pages.
To worsen matters, the luckless printer was stuck with several hundred unsold copies
and grumbled that he didn’t clear five pounds on the whole deal.”); MILLER, supra
note 166, at 192.
174. See Letter from Archibald McLean to Robert Troup (Oct. 11, 1788), in THE INTIMATE
LIFE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 82 (Allan McLane Hamilton ed., 1910) (“The money expended
for Printing, Paper, Journeyman’s Wages and Binding was upwards of two hundred and twenty
Pounds; of which sum I have charged Col. Hamilton with 144 pounds.”).
175. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 394; KETCHAM, supra note 106, at 6–7.
176. BRANT, supra note 15, at 185 (“Madison’s service in the Continental Congress
came to a close when he set out for home on March 4, 1788, the day after his final
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In any case, the total expenses incurred in the publication of the
Federalist Papers far exceeded the ability of a person of ordinary means to
pay. Although 220 pounds may not seem like a large amount, it was a
considerable sum for the 1780s. By way of comparison, the annual rent for
Madison’s Philadelphia home was 200 pounds.177 In modern terms, the
Federalist Papers certainly cost many thousands of dollars to publish. The
precise conversion to modern dollars depends on the currency Hamilton
and McLean used. The reference to “pounds” may mean British pounds,
which remained in circulation for years after the Revolutionary War. If
that was the case, 220 British pounds in 1787 translates to about $36,604
in 2020.178 To be sure, that figure must be used with caution. The
eighteenth century American currency system was “a highly confusing”
combination of English currency, foreign coins (especially Spanish and
Portuguese), and American money.179 The states, including Pennsylvania,
sometimes referred to their local currency as “pounds.”180 In any case, in
his writings in the 1780s, Hamilton referred to his possession of “pounds
sterling,” a common term for the British pound.181 For example, in a letter
to his brother in June 1785, Hamilton promised to send fifty “pounds
sterling” to relieve his brother’s financial distress.182

Federalist article was published. He was then, an audit showed, overdrawn £100 for
salary and expenses, which he refunded to the state.”).
177. Roland M. Baumann, John Swanwick: Spokesman for “Merchant-Republicanism” in
Philadelphia, 1790–1798, 97 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 131, 168 n.172 (1973)
(“Swanwick secured for the Madisons a three-story brick house in Philadelphia for a
yearly rent of £200.”).
178. For the conversion of historical British pounds to modern U.S. dollars, see
Eric W. Nye, Pounds Sterling to Dollars: Historical Conversion of Currency, UNIV. OF WYO.,
https://www.uwyo.edu/numimage/currency.htm [https://perma.cc/G6HD-CYAR].
179. EDWIN J. PERKINS, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, 1700–
1815, at 25–26 (1994).
180. Farley Grubb, Creating the U.S. Dollar Currency Union, 1748–1811: A Quest for
Monetary Stability or a Usurpation of State Sovereignty for Personal Gain?, 93 AM. ECON.
REV. 1778, 1783, 1787 (2003); Ronald W. Michener and Robert E. Wright, State
“Currencies” and the Transition to the U.S. Dollar: Clarifying Some Confusions, 95 AM.
ECON. REV. 682, 685 (2005) (“We contend that the ‘Pennsylvania pounds’ mentioned
in these records do not refer specifically to Pennsylvania bills of credit. . . . Media of
exchange were usually not denominated in pounds and included such diverse means
of payment as country produce; foreign coins such as Spanish dollars, pistareens, or
guineas; paper money; book account transfers; or a combination thereof.”).
181. Joseph Albert Ernst, MONEY AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1755–1775, at xviii (1973)
(“Pounds sterling would be the value of anything stated in terms of English sterling.”).
182. Alexander Hamilton to James Hamilton, 22 June 1785, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-03-02-0444
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But whatever the precise amount that the 220 pounds converts to
in modern terms, not many people—then or now—could afford the
expense of publishing the Federalist Papers. Hamilton’s bank account
(and perhaps Madison’s too)183—combined with the publisher’s
willingness to bear a significant share of the costs—made it possible
for the Federalist Papers to reach readers during the critical months of
the ratification debate. Would the public have been better served if
privileged individuals like Hamilton and Madison had refrained from
using their personal financial resources to broadcast their political
message? It seems hard to see how the answer could be yes, especially in
light of the widespread veneration of the Federalist Papers today. The fact
that the authors possessed far more wealth than the general population—
and thus had a larger platform on which to speak—did not make the
sentiments they expressed any less valuable. As the Supreme Court
emphasized in Citizens United, “[t]he rule that political speech cannot be
limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the
premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of
political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”184
The Federalist Papers provided a microcosm of the role of money in
the broader battle for public opinion during the ratification debate.
The battle pitted the proratification Federalists against the
Constitution’s opponents, known collectively as the Anti-Federalists.185
The Federalists, of course, ultimately prevailed. One reason why was
because they possessed a crucial communications advantage: they and

[https://perma.cc/ZE65-N6SC] (“The situation you describe yourself to be in gives me
much pain, and nothing will make me happier than, as far as may be in my power, to
contribute to your relief. I will cheerfully pay your draft upon me for fifty pounds sterling,
whenever it shall appear. I wish it was in my power to desire you to enlarge the sum; but
though my future prospects are of the most flattering kind my present engagements
would render it inconvenient to me to advance you a larger sum.”).
183. Hamilton was also willing to go into debt on behalf of public service. See
CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 483 (“The plain truth was that Hamilton was indebted
and needed money badly. . . . If Hamilton had a vice, it was clearly a craving for
power, not money, and he left public office much poorer than he entered it.”).
184. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010).
185. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 134 (1996) (“One irony of ratification was that both sides had to
appeal to a public opinion in which they placed little confidence”); CLINTON
ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 278–79 (1987) (explaining that the
Federalists supported ratification and the Anti-Federalists opposed it); STORING, supra
note 154, at 5 (“The Anti-Federalists were primarily against the Constitution”).
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their allies owned most of the newspapers in the late 1780s.186 Far from
an “impartial medium,” newspapers played a critical role by actively
promoting the ratification cause.187 In fact, only twelve out of the
nation’s 100 newspapers supported the Anti-Federalists.188 Business
considerations played a significant role in the lopsided coverage.
Newspaper editors feared offending the powerful merchant class,
which supported the Federalists.189 As James Madison himself would
later note, newspaper publishers depended on the advertising
revenues that they generated from merchants.190 Making their pages
available to the Anti-Federalists posed a financial risk that few
newspaper owners or editors could afford.191 The financial influence
of the merchant class thus gave the Federalists a significant advantage
in the communications war with the Anti-Federalists.
The Federalist advantage in the dissemination of information was
not the primary reason the Constitution was ultimately adopted.192
The most important asset the Federalists possessed was the fact that
George Washington and Ben Franklin supported the Constitution.193
186. RAKOVE, supra note 185, at 135 (describing how “a predominantly Federalist
press” promoted ratification).
187. Id. at 146.
188. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at
486 (1969).
189. Id. at 486–87. On the widespread support for ratification among merchants
and others engaged in interstate and international commerce, see the
groundbreaking quantitative analysis of ROBERT A. MCGUIRE, TO FORM A MORE
PERFECT UNION: A NEW ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 142 (2002). “Delegates with merchant interests . . . were more likely to
have voted to ratify the Constitution than were others.” Id.
190. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 423.
191. WOOD, supra note 188, at 486–87 (explaining how “editors ‘afraid to offend the great
men, or Merchants who could work their ruin,’ closed their columns to the opposition”).
192. JOHN K. ALEXANDER, THE SELLING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A
HISTORY OF NEWS COVERAGE 202 (1990) (“[N]ews media coverage of the convention
essentially belonged to those who came to be called Federalists. . . . There is no effective
way to assess the degree to which people were moved or possibly even controlled by the
news media. Nevertheless . . . much of the coverage of the convention had been artfully
calculated to prepare the minds of the people to receive any form of government the
delegates offered.”); RAKOVE, supra note 185, at 146 (“But even taking these disadvantages
into account, it seems doubtful that the course of public debate hinged on an imbalance
in the dissemination of information and opinion.”).
193. RAKOVE, supra note 185, at 135 (“Appeals to the collective stature of the
Convention and the prestige of Washington and Franklin thus formed an important
element of Federalist strategy.”); see also id. at 136 (“All doubts should vanish simply because
the two greatest Americans of their age had joined in framing the Constitution.”).
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As America’s “only two national heroes” in the 1780s, Washington
and Franklin commanded extraordinary influence with the public.194
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton later asserted that the decisive factor in
the Constitution’s ratification was the “very great weight of influence
of the persons who framed it, particularly in the universal popularity
of General Washington.”195 Likewise, Madison observed, “[h]ad the
Constitution been framed & recommended by an obscure individual,
instead of the body possessing public respect & confidence, there can
not be a doubt, that altho’ it would have stood in the identical words,
it would have commanded little attention from those who now
admire its wisdom.”196
In the end, no amount of Anti-Federalist arguments could overcome the
fact that the most respected leaders in America sided with the Federalists.
But it took a concerted campaign of editorials, pamphlets, and
handbills to inform the public that Washington and Franklin supported
ratification.197 The Federalists’ access to a broad network of sympathetic
newspapers, publishers, and pamphleteers made sure that the public was
repeatedly reminded of the crucial fact that Washington and Franklin
backed the Constitution.198
The key point is simply that money influenced the outcome of the
ratification debate. It was expensive to communicate a political message,
even in 1787. From the very beginning of American politics, therefore,
Madison, Hamilton, and the Constitution’s other framers understood
that money was essential to disseminating political speech. Indeed,
without it, the Constitution might never have been ratified in the first
place. It is also noteworthy that the contending parties did not have a
level financial playing field. The Federalists’ financial resources gave
them a clear advantage in the communications battle. Under the logic
of Austin, therefore, the Federalists had “an unfair advantage in the
194. ROSSITER, supra note 185, at 278.
195. RAKOVE, supra note 185, at 135.
196. Id. at 139.
197. ROSSITER, supra note 185, at 278 (observing that “this elite—or series of
elites—did as effective a job of arguing and manipulating as could have been done in
those days of slow-paced communications and primitive organization” and noting
“the Federalist argument that what was good enough for Washington and Franklin
should be good enough for every American.”).
198. RAKOVE, supra note 185, at 135–36; ROSSITER, supra note 185, at 279 (“In the
end, the Federalist won this war because they numbered among their leaders an
overpowering majority of the word-makers—preachers, teachers, pamphleteers,
editors, and lawyers—of republican America.”).
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political marketplace” because they used their superior “resources
amassed in the economic marketplace.”199 But under the approach laid
out by the Court in Citizens United, the Federalist communications
advantage would not be subject to government regulation because the
government does not have a constitutionally permissible interest “in
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the
outcome of elections.”200 The Citizens United ruling is thus far more
consistent with the practices of those who supported the Constitution’s
ratification than Austin’s antidistortion rationale.
Most important of all, Madison and Hamilton put the lessons they
learned in the ratification battle to practical use in the momentous
political struggles of the 1790s. After the Constitution’s ratification in
1788, a new ideological schism developed.201 A rapidly intensifying
partisan divide pitted President Washington, Vice President Adams, and
Treasury Secretary Hamilton on one side against Secretary of State
Jefferson and Congressman Madison on the other.202 The dispute
concerned the economic policies of the new nation. As head of the
Treasury Department, Hamilton had centralized federal power through
the establishment of a national bank, the federal assumption of state
government debts, the industrialization of the American economy, and
the promotion of a strong federal union.203 In the process, the
Hamiltonian program concentrated power in urban areas, especially in
the North, a consolidation that threatened to reduce the influence of
rural areas, especially in the South.204

199. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990).
200. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam)).
201. WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 43, 45.
202. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 392, 395 (“On issue after issue, ranging from
redemption of war debt to creating a national bank, Washington had sided with
Hamilton against Jefferson and Madison.”); DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC:
POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 136 (1980); FORREST MCDONALD, THE
PRESIDENCY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 17–18 (1987).
203. LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY
IDEOLOGY 128, 129 (1978) (“Hamilton’s ideal was a great republic, and his model for
greatness was Britain. He realized that Britain’s strength rested on commerce,
manufacturing, a sound currency, and the world’s best system of public finance. He
meant to make America a match.”); MCCOY, supra note 202, at 134.
204. Id. at 153–54; see also WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 46 (“The early congressional
clashes over Hamilton’s policies had a strong sectional character, pitting the North
against the South.”).
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Hamilton’s policies horrified Madison and Jefferson, Virginians
born and bred in the state’s agricultural heartland.205 Although
Madison sided with Hamilton during the ratification debate, he
feared that Hamilton’s financial policies would corrupt the new
nation’s republican virtues.206 Madison thus joined with Jefferson to
preserve America’s agrarian nature and resist the concentration of
financial power in northeastern cities.207
But Jefferson and Madison had no hope of stopping Hamilton
unless they could win elections. President Washington sided with
Hamilton, which meant that Jefferson and Madison had minimal
influence within the Administration.208 In order to block Hamilton,
therefore, they would have to build a political base outside the
Washington Administration. To that end, they abandoned their longstanding misgivings about political parties and started a partisan
faction of their own, which they called the “Republicans” to
distinguish it from Hamilton’s Federalist faction.209 Even before
George Washington’s first term as president had ended, a full-blown
war for public opinion erupted between the Federalists and
Republicans. Both sides poured money—including, remarkably,
money from government sources—to any newspaper editor willing to
promote the Federalist or Republican party lines.210
205. BANNING, supra note 203, at 154; CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 391; MCCOY,
supra note 202, at 153–55; WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 42, 44–49.
206. BANNING, supra note 203, at 154 (“Only after the completion of Hamilton’s
economic program did Jefferson and Madison turn explicitly and systematically to
the charges of conspiracy and corruption that others had occasionally suggested in
Congress and the press.”).
207. Id. at 154, 300.
208. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 395.
209. KETCHAM, supra note 156, at 119 (“He even joined Jefferson in founding an
antiministerial, republican party, which each conceived as ‘a party to end all parties,’
that is, an instrument, a temporary means to overcome the power of party (inherently
malignant) so skillfully mustered by Hamilton.”).
210. Herbert E. Alexander, Financing Presidential Campaigns, in 4 HISTORY OF AMERICAN
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS: 1789–1968, at 3870 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 1971) (“The
system of a newspaper supporting, and being supported by, one political faction or the
other—and often supplemented with government printing subsidies—quickly developed.
Editors’ fortunes rose and fell with the political success of their patrons. Newspapers
vilified candidates mercilessly, and various factions spun off their own papers.”); CULVER
H. SMITH, THE PRESS, POLITICS, AND PATRONAGE: THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT’S USE OF
NEWSPAPERS, 1789–1875, at 13 (1977) (“Certain papers, published in the capital, came to
be regarded as the personal organs of Hamilton and Jefferson, giving authoritative
expression to the questions at issue between them.”).
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The first editor to join the fray was John Fenno, owner of the Gazette of
the United States.211 Hamilton persuaded Fenno to establish the newspaper
in 1789.212 The Gazette immediately became the preeminent vehicle for
Federalist propaganda. Fenno’s newspaper attacked President
Washington’s critics, advocated on behalf of the Administration’s
controversial financial program, and described Hamilton in “adoring”
terms.213 In defending the Washington Administration, the Gazette
published anonymous articles, including some written by Hamilton
himself.214 But Fenno’s support did not come for free. To keep the
Gazette afloat, the Federalists directed private and public money to the
newspaper and its owner. The Federalist-controlled Senate awarded
Fenno government printing contracts and Secretary Hamilton granted
him the Treasury Department’s printing contracts.215 Fenno made no
secret of his special business relationship with the government. He
added to the Gazette’s masthead the words “By Authority,” brazenly
signaling his semi-official status in the Washington Administration.216 But
Fenno always seemed to need more money. At one point, he even issued
an appeal to “the wealthy part of the community”—a core Federalist
constituency—for financial assistance.217 Keenly aware of the newspaper’s
political potency, Hamilton raised money on the paper’s behalf and
personally loaned $2000 to Fenno to keep the Gazette in business.218 As the
historian Culver Smith has observed, “the paper was too valuable to
Hamilton and the Federalists to let it die.”219
The effectiveness of the Federalist propaganda campaign convinced
Jefferson and Madison that they had to fight fire with fire.220 Like
Hamilton, they understood that money was essential to communicating
their political message effectively. Accordingly, Jefferson hired the

211. WILLIAM J. SMALL, POLITICAL POWER AND THE PRESS 48 (1972); SMITH, supra
note 210, at 13.
212. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 395.
213. Id.; SMALL, supra note 211, at 48; SMITH, supra note 210, at 14.
214. SMALL, supra note 211, at 51 (Hamilton “privately wrote for . . . the Gazette of
the United States”); SMITH, supra note 210, at 14.
215. SMALL, supra note 211, at 49.
216. SMITH, supra note 210, at 13. In fact, Fenno appeared in a directory of
government officers in 1791. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 395.
217. SMITH, supra note 210, at 14.
218. See CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 395; SMITH, supra note 210, at 14.
219. SMITH, supra note 210, at 14.
220. WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 49.
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talented editor Philip Freneau as a Republican propagandist.221 To
secure Freneau’s services, Jefferson gave him a job as a government
translator, a position that paid $250 a year and involved no actual
responsibilities.222 To sweeten the offer, Madison promised Freneau that
he would receive all of the State Department’s printing contracts, as long
as Freneau advocated for the Republican cause.223
Madison and Jefferson’s financial inducements worked. Freneau
founded the National Gazette, which immediately became the principal
communication vehicle for advancing Jefferson and Madison’s political
agenda.224 The newspaper made no pretense of objectivity.225 It sometimes
made wild allegations, including once claiming that Hamilton’s financial
plan had diverted $50 million in public funds to wealthy special interests.226
Many of the attacks came from the pens of Madison and Jefferson
themselves, who both wrote unsigned articles for the National Gazette.227
The National Gazette’s attacks infuriated Hamilton and Washington. In
an anonymous public letter, Hamilton revealed that Jefferson had used
government funds to finance Freneau’s partisan attacks on the
Federalists.228 Sarcastically, Hamilton called Jefferson’s use of
government money for partisan purposes “an experiment somewhat
new in the history of political manoevres in this country.”229 But it was a
questionable line of attack because Hamilton had used government
funds to pay John Fenno, the Federalist publicist. Accordingly, Freneau
replied to Hamilton’s letter by pointing out that the Federalists had
rewarded “the immaculate Mr. John Fenno” with a government contract
worth $2000 a year.230 One can only wonder what the electorate thought
of the revelation that the Federalists and Republicans had used
government funds to finance their partisan propaganda campaigns.
221. SMALL, supra note 211, at 48.
222. Id. at 48–49. As Jefferson explained, “[t]he clerkship for foreign languages in my
office is vacant; the salary, indeed, is very low, being two hundred and fifty dollars a year;
but it also gives so little to do as not to interfere with any other office one may choose.” Id.
223. See SMITH, supra note 210, at 15.
224. SMALL, supra note 211, at 49; WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 49–50.
225. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 396 (“Like other newspapers of the 1790s,
Freneau’s National Gazette did not feign neutrality.”).
226. See SMITH, supra note 210, at 16.
227. See SMALL, supra note 211, at 50. See generally ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note
164, at 266–70 (noting Madison began writing for the paper only three weeks after it
was established).
228. SMITH, supra note 210, at 16.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 17.
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The partisan press war appalled President Washington. He described
the National Gazette’s editorials as “outrages of common decency.”231
But the President’s efforts to silence the newspaper failed. When
Washington ordered Jefferson to fire Freneau from his government
position, Jefferson refused, asserting that Freneau’s “paper has saved
our constitution which was galloping fast into monarchy.”232 By the end
of his presidency, newspapers had become such vicious vehicles of
partisan attacks that Washington stopped reading them altogether,
confining himself to reading advertisements because he believed they
were “the only truths we can rely on in a newspaper.”233
Madison possessed an equally skeptical view of the supposed
neutrality and objectivity of the press. His perspective anticipated key
aspects of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. In Citizens United, the
Supreme Court warned that a ban on corporate speech “would
produce the dangerous, and unacceptable, consequence that
Congress could ban political speech of media corporations.”234
Although the dissent claimed that a special constitutional protection
might be extended to protect media corporations,235 Justice Kennedy
found no reasonable grounds to distinguish media corporations from
ordinary business corporations.236 As Kennedy explained:
So even assuming the most doubtful proposition that a news organization
has a right to speak when others do not, the exemption would allow a
conglomerate that owns both a media business and an unrelated business
to influence or control the media in order to advance its overall business
interest. At the same time, some other corporation, with an identical
business interest but no media outlet in its ownership structure, would be
forbidden to speak or inform the public about the same issue. This
differential treatment cannot be squared with the First Amendment.237

231. SMALL, supra note 211, at 49.
232. JON MEACHAM, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE ART OF POWER 273 (2012); SMALL,
supra note 211, at 49.
233. SMALL, supra note 211, at 54–55.
234. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010).
235. Id. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he drafters of the First
Amendment did draw distinctions—explicit distinctions—between types of
‘speakers,’ or speech outlets or forms . . . . The text and history highlighted by our
colleagues suggests why one type of corporation, those that are part of the press,
might be able to claim special First Amendment status, and therefore why some kinds
of ‘identity’-based distinctions might be permissible after all. Once one accepts that
much, the intellectual edifice of the majority opinion crumbles.”).
236. Id. at 352–53.
237. Id.
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Likewise, James Madison ridiculed the idea that news organizations
occupied a more elevated and objective perspective than other
business ventures. Indeed, Madison believed that business
considerations inevitably shaped newspapers’ coverage of public
affairs just as they did any other revenue-generating enterprise. He
observed that although newspapers ostensibly stood as the “guardian
of public rights” and the “organ of necessary truths,” the reality as he
saw it was that newspapers took pains not to offend advertisers.238
Newspapers, he complained, found themselves in “prostration to
advertising customers.”239 Since merchants and other commercial
interests represented a disproportionately large share of their
advertisers, newspapers in Madison’s time period took a pro-British
and protrade position.240 Accordingly, Madison concluded that the
press was “tainted with partiality.”241 The notion of an independent,
neutral press corps free of business considerations thus struck
Madison as absurd, just as it did Justice Kennedy in Citizens United.
In addition to using government funds to establish partisan
newspapers, Madison and Jefferson turned to wealthy individuals to
bankroll their new party. One of their most important financial
backers was the wealthy Philadelphia merchant John Swanwick, who
used his personal fortune to finance Republican campaigns in
Pennsylvania in the 1790s.242 In 1794 Swanwick’s campaign war chest
enabled him to win a congressional seat of his own in Philadelphia,
which previously had been a Federalist stronghold.243 Swanwick’s use
of his personal fortune to win elections did not trouble James
Madison. Quite the reverse. Madison celebrated Swanwick’s victory,
238. See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 423. For the full editorial, see James Madison,
Foreign Influence, PHILADELPHIA AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER, Jan. 23, 1799, available at
Founders Online, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Madison/01-17-02-0140 [https://perma.cc/2UL2-YN82].
239. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 423
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Roland M. Baumann, John Swanwick: Spokesman for ““MerchantRepublicanism” in Philadelphia, 1790–1798, 97 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 131, 163
(1973) (“He was, moreover, a valuable ally since his cashbox over the years was used
to subsidize the infant Republican Party organization.”).
243. Id. at 164, 181 (describing the three-term Federalist incumbent Thomas
Fitzsimmons and noting that Swanwick was “Philadelphia’s first Republican
congressman”). Swanwick was not “afraid to employ his own fortune to insure his
political success.” Id. at 163, 165 (“[F]ew other men in the party could afford a costly
congressional campaign and service in an underpaid political office.”).
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describing it as “of material consequence” because it occurred in the
country’s commercial and political capital.244 In Congress, Swanwick
would continue to put his fortune at the disposal of Republican causes,
organizing public rallies and printing petitions and handbills that
advocated Republican policies.245 Throughout, he maintained a close
personal relationship with Madison, even securing a rental home in
Philadelphia for Madison and his wife, Dolley.246
When Washington announced he would not run for a third term in
1796, the rivalry between the Federalists and the Republicans gave rise to
the first contested presidential election in American history. The 1796
election pitted Jefferson against Vice President Adams in a campaign
that both sides viewed as a battle for the republic’s survival.247 Adams and
the incumbent Federalist Party ultimately won the election, but the
Republicans employed innovative campaign tactics that ushered in a
new—and much more expensive—era of American politics. The most
important innovations came from Madison’s close political ally, John
Beckley, who developed a mass distribution system for Republican
political literature.248 Madison and Jefferson placed great value on
Beckley’s skills.249 As the historian Noble Cunningham has observed,
Beckley was “a mysterious sort of person” who “worked behind the scenes”
where he “displayed much skill in the realm of practical politics” and
“knew how to win elections.”250 In Pennsylvania alone Beckley distributed
30,000 tickets, which helped voters write Republican candidates and
electors on their ballots.251 He also printed and circulated copies of
Republican campaign speeches.252 The cost of Beckley’s electioneering
tactics is unknown, but printing came at a high cost, as Hamilton and
Madison had discovered a decade before with the Federalist Papers.
One key lesson that Jefferson and Madison took from the 1796
election was the importance of marshalling campaign funds. In a letter
244. Id. at 164.
245. Id. at 167.
246. See id. at 168 n.172 (“Swanwick secured for the Madisons a three-story brick
house in Philadelphia for a yearly rent of £200.”).
247. Page Smith, Election of 1796, in 1 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS: 1789–1968, supra note 210, at 62–63.
248. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 29, at 105–06.
249. Id. at 45 (Beckley was recognized by Republicans as possessing “the
confidence of our two illustrious patriots Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison”).
250. Id. at 102.
251. Id. at 105–06.
252. Id. at 102, 104, 106.
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to Madison in February 1799, Jefferson urged that no expense be spared
by Republicans in the 1800 election, which pitted Jefferson against
Adams in a rematch of the 1796 race.253 Republicans, Jefferson wrote,
must engage in “systematic energies and sacrifices. The engine is the
press. Every man must lay his purse and his pen under contribution.”254
Jefferson practiced what he preached, contributing his own “purse”
to the Republican press effort.255 For example, he paid James
Callender, a newspaper writer, to launch vicious attacks on President
Adams in the Richmond Examiner.256 After the election, Jefferson
privately acknowledged his covert financial role in the campaign: “I as
well as most other republicans who were in the way of doing it,
contributed what I could to the support of the republican papers and
printers, paid sums of money for the Bee, the Albany Register, etc.”257
In addition to funding newspapers, Jefferson paid for the circulation
of Republican campaign pamphlets.258
Interestingly, Madison does not seem to have joined Jefferson in
investing his own funds in the Republican effort. The historian
Robert Allen Rutland has estimated that during Madison’s long career
in elective office his “total campaign expenses could not have
exceeded one hundred dollars.”259 Madison was content to let others
finance his campaigns for him, and there was no shortage of volunteers
among wealthy Republican supporters. As Jefferson had urged,
Republicans spared no expense in establishing partisan newspapers
across the country in 1799 and 1800.260 Federalists and Republicans
alike viewed party-controlled newspapers “as a most important
instrument for influencing the electorate.”261 In addition to
establishing partisan newspapers, both parties distributed vast
numbers of pamphlets and handbills to sway public opinion.262

253. Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., Election of 1800, in 1 HISTORY OF AMERICAN
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS: 1789–1968, supra note 210, at 114.
254. Id. at 114.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Alexander, supra note 210, at 3870.
259. RUTLAND, supra note 28, at 1–2.
260. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 29, at 172–73.
261. Id. at 167.
262. Id. at 214, 223–24; RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE PRESIDENTIAL GAME: THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 67 (1982). The 1800 election was “more
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The Republicans proved far more adept at campaigning than their
Federalists opponents.263 Not coincidentally, the Republicans prevailed
in the election, a victory that led to the first transfer of power from one
party to another in American history.264 The Federalist defeat in 1800
resulted at least in part from the party’s failure to adapt to a changing
political landscape. The Republican tactic of inundating the voting
public with campaign literature astounded the Federalists.265 Many
Federalists believed campaigning was beneath the dignity of elected
officials as it led to “loud and so indecently rude” public displays on
election day.266 They found particularly appalling the Republican
innovation of sending candidates and orators on the campaign trail to
communicate directly with the electorate.267 According to the
Federalists, Republicans made campaign speeches that were “foolish and
inflammatory” and “fraught with all the falsehood imaginable—solely
with a view to affect our election.”268 They also decried the Republicans’
distribution of printed tickets, which Federalists saw as a form of
cheating because it assisted voters in writing Republican candidates
and electors on their ballots.269
Republican tactics may have made elections more noisy,
competitive, and boisterous, but they also had the crucial advantage
that they worked.270 John Beckley once again employed his
electioneering genius to bombard voters with campaign literature.271
In one of his many groundbreaking techniques, he wrote a campaign
biography of Thomas Jefferson and then arranged for 5000 copies of
it to be printed and distributed in multiple states.272 In many other
ways, Republicans used money to get their message out to voters.
Some Republican leaders paid for pamphlets attacking John
Adams.273 Others used more indirect but equally effective methods.

than a personal duel, more than a competition involving parties of notables, it was a
contest between recently organized political parties.” MCCORMICK, supra, at 70.
263. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 29, at 258–59.
264. Cunningham, supra note 253, at 134.
265. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 29, at 206.
266. Id. at 252.
267. Id. at 207.
268. Id. at 209.
269. See id. at 206–07.
270. Id. at 252, 258–59.
271. Id. at 197.
272. Id. at 197–98.
273. Id. at 198.

2020]

MADISON, CITIZENS UNITED, AND THE CONSTITUTION

1523

For example, at a time when the incumbent Federalists controlled the
printing contracts of the presidential and congressional branches,
Republican legislatures gave lucrative state printing contracts to
newspapers that would support Republican candidates.274 The Republican
campaign tactics represented a systematic effort to communicate with the
national electorate. As Noble Cunningham has explained:
In their attention to party organization and machinery, the
Republicans remained constantly aware of the necessity of
maintaining popular support. Party spokesmen therefore exploited
every available agency of mass communication: official papers such
as petitions against governmental measures, public circular letters
from congressmen to their constituents, newspapers, pamphlets,
handbills, private letters which circulated among leading figures,
and personal contacts and word-of-mouth communications.275

The volume of campaign literature sometimes overwhelmed voters.276
As a South Carolina observer complained, “[w]e are so beset and run
down by Federal republicans and their pamphlets that I begin to think
for the first time that there is rottenness in the system they attempt to
support, or why all this violent electioneering?”277
But it worked. After the election, the Federalist leader Fisher Ames
admitted that the Republicans’ “unceasing use” of partisan newspapers
helped make Jefferson’s victory possible.278 The Federalists’ comparatively
restrained approach to campaigning had no chance of succeeding against
aggressive Republican campaign tactics. It would never again be viewed as
“improper” for candidates and parties to “campaign for election.”279
Jefferson’s victory in 1800 thus represented a turning point in campaign
tactics. In 1790, candidates had relied on their own personal assets and
conducted minimalist campaigns of modest scale.280 But, by the end of the
decade, the nature of American election campaigns had radically
changed.281 The “detestable practice of electioneering” was here to stay.282

274. Id. at 173.
275. Id. at 259.
276. Alexander, supra note 210, at 3870.
277. Id.
278. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 29, at 167.
279. Id. at 252 (“A candidate’s efforts to win an election could now be viewed not
merely as personal ambition but as a contribution to the party cause.”).
280. Id. at 249 (“A candidate for political office generally had to rely upon his own
resources and those of his friends to promote his election.”).
281. See id. at 251 (“By the end of the decade of the nineties, the growth of political
parties had wrought fundamental alterations in the political life of the country.”).

1524

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1485

The crucial question, of course, is where did the Republican money
come from? There was no Federal Election Commission and no public
reporting of campaign expenditures in 1800.283 Thus, we will never know
who paid for Beckley’s 5000 campaign biographies of Jefferson, nor how
many wealthy individuals the Republicans relied on to finance their
political communications. What we do know is that Jefferson, Madison,
and the other figures of the day went out of their way to avoid disclosing
how they financed their election campaigns. For example, Jefferson
urged that Madison take pains to keep his role in the political writing
campaign “sacredly secret.”284 Likewise, Jefferson hid his own role in the
Republicans’ expensive communications strategy.285 “Do not let my
name be connected with the business” of distributing pro-Republican
political pamphlets, he instructed James Monroe in February 1799.286
Other politicians in the early national period maintained a similar level
of secrecy. For example, on behalf of Aaron Burr’s gubernatorial
campaign, New York Congressman Peter Van Gaasbeck paid for a rally
in Kingston, New York.287 But Gaasbeck instructed his allies not to
disclose the source of the funds. “When you go to Kingston,” Gaasbeck
wrote one of the rally’s organizers, “assure our Friends that every
expense they are at will be cordially refunded from him who is not to be
seen in that act; now my worthy fellow put the wheel in Motion.”288
It seems virtually certain that wealthy and politically connected
individuals bore the vast majority of campaign costs in the early national
period. Few ordinary Americans had disposable income to spend on
contributing to an election campaign. Indeed, as Noble Cunningham
noted, the rise of the Republican Party organization did not come from
the “grass roots.”289 Instead, wealthy candidates like Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison, powerful party leaders like John Beckley, and
business figures with a financial interest in the outcome of elections
drove the creation of the innovative—and expensive—Republican

282. Id. at 207.
283. Alexander, supra note 210, at 3869 (“Little is known of campaign finance in
the early days of the Republic. With no requirement that records be filed, only
fragmentary bits of information have surfaced.”).
284. Cunningham, supra note 253, at 114.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 29, at 259–60.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 259.
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tactics of 1800, such as buying control of newspapers, distributing
campaign literature, and holding election rallies.290
The bottom line, therefore, is that James Madison’s political career
illustrated the distinction between republican theories of political
purity on the one hand, and the inescapable reality on the other that
communicating with voters costs money. Madison began his political
career in 1777 with a surprising defeat because he renounced the role of
money in politics. He spent the rest of his career relying on well-to-do
allies to fund his political activities, an effort that would culminate in two
presidential terms of his own. None of his success would have been
possible without financial backers who funded his and his party’s
political communications. Although young Madison had a fairly
puritanical view of the role of money in politics, there is no evidence
that he felt guilty about his campaign tactics later in life. He certainly left
no indication that he thought relying on wealthy donors to fund his
party’s political activities rendered his party corrupt.
IV. MADISON’S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT OF
FREE SPEECH
In the spring of 1789, Congressman Madison proposed amending the
Constitution by adding a bill of rights.291 His views on the subject had
changed over time. At the Virginia ratification convention the year before,
Madison had argued that “no bill of rights was necessary because ‘all
powers not given are reserved.’”292 Even after he began work on the Bill of
Rights, the right of free speech did not command much of Madison’s
thinking.293 In the late 1780s and early 1790s, the issue of religious
freedom loomed much larger in his mind than the issue of free speech.294

290. Id. (“In the 1790’s one rarely finds effective party organization springing
from the so-called ‘grass roots.’ Instead, the organization of the Republican party and
the introduction of smoothly functioning party machinery were due largely to the
leadership of a few dedicated and influential political leaders, such as Jefferson,
Madison, members of Congress, John Beckley, and others. The newspapers report
numerous popular party gatherings, but this more abundant source of information
has often obscured the fact that the archives hold not a few confidential letters
revealing the careful preparation that commonly preceded such meetings.”).
291. BRANT, supra note 15, at 268.
292. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 230, 232.
293. Id. at 429 (“In drafting the Constitution, Madison had paid no attention at all
to the phenomenon of free speech.”).
294. BRANT, supra note 15, at 268 (“Religious freedom was Madison’s first concern,
both in drafting his amendments and in the deliberations which now ensued.”).
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At the time that Madison wrote the First Amendment, it was not
even clear what “freedom of speech” and “freedom of the press” really
meant. As the scholar Eugene Volokh has explained, the phrase
“freedom of the press” referred to the technology of printing and
publishing, and not to any special constitutional protection for
newspapers, editors, or journalists.295 Moreover, many Americans in the
1790s believed that the right of free expression only protected against
prior restraint, not post-publication punishment of speech.296 As the
revolutionary pamphleteer Thomas Paine observed, “the term liberty of
the press . . . refers to the fact of printing free from prior restraint . . . .”297 The
Federalist Party, in particular, took a restrictive view of the right of free
expression.298 Federalists controlled the White House and Congress
throughout the 1790s, and they proved quite willing to punish their
political opponents for speech critical of the incumbent party.299
The political battles of the 1790s brought the issue of freedom of
expression to the forefront of Madison’s thinking. In 1791—the same
year the First Amendment was adopted—Madison and Jefferson
began their propaganda war against the Federalists by enlisting the
services of Philip Freneau and his National Gazette.300 Madison saw the
Republican press as essential for combating Hamilton’s ideas and for
advancing the Jeffersonian political agenda.301 The struggle against
295. Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry or for the Press as a Technology?
From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 459, 538 (2012) (“[P]eople during the
Framing era likely understood the text as fitting the press-as-technology model as securing
the right of every person to use communications technology, and not just securing a right
belonging exclusively to members of the publishing industry. The text was likely not
understood as treating the press-as-industry differently from other people who wanted to
rent or borrow the press-as-technology on an occasional basis.”).
296. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 429; LEONARD W. LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, RIGHTS, AND HISTORY 61 (1995) (“[T]he free press clause,
like the due process clause, had only an established common law meaning: freedom
to speak, write, and publish as one pleased, subject to subsequent punishment for
being too offensive.”).
297. LEVY, supra note 296, at 42.
298. See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 429 (discussing the Federalists’ belief that the
First Amendment only prohibited pre-publication speech, not punishing seditious
libel post-publication); JOHN FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE 364–65 (1992); DAVID
MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 505–06 (2001).
299. See FERLING, supra note 298, at 364 (discussing the attacks on the Federalist party
and how the Federalist party responded); MCCULLOUGH, supra note 298, at 505–06.
300. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 396.
301. See id. at 396, 400 (“Freneau’s National Gazette provided a handy platform for
Madison.”); SMALL, supra note 211, at 48–49; SMITH, supra note 210, at 14–15.
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Hamilton thus taught Madison the importance of a robust, highly
partisan opposition press. Writing in December 1791 in the National
Gazette, Madison emphasized the importance of a “general intercourse of
sentiments.”302 To that end, he advocated a “free press, and particularly a
circulation of newspapers through the entire body of the people.”303
Crucially, of course, Madison did not mean a free press in the
modern sense of a neutral, detached corps of professional editors
and writers committed to journalistic objectivity. No newspaper met
that definition in the 1790s.304 As the historian Ron Chernow has
observed, newspapers in the 1790s “were unabashedly partisan organs
that supplied much of the adhesive power binding the incipient
parties together.”305 Newspapers did little in the way of reporting facts
and instead focused on offering partisan opinions on the issues of the
day.306 During the early national period, therefore, newspapers “more
closely resembled journals of opinion than daily newspapers.”307
Indeed, Madison used the National Gazette to launch “anonymous
blasts against Hamilton,” including falsely insinuating that Hamilton
was personally corrupt and was conspiring against the United States
with its British enemies.308 To Madison, the phrase “freedom of the
press” meant the freedom to print vicious—and, depending on one’s
point of view, false—partisan attacks on the party in power. The
printing press thus offered Madison and Jefferson a crucial vehicle
for communicating with the electorate.
Madison’s broad conception of the right of free expression clashed
with the Federalist efforts to silence their critics. The Federalist
campaign of political repression prompted Madison to take a broad
view of the First Amendment, one that was highly protective of the

302. GERALD LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY,
EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 1780S–1830S, at 53 (2019).
303. Id.
304. RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, supra note 262, at 65 (explaining that most
newspapers had partisan interests); Jeffrey L. Pasley, 1800 as a Revolution in Political
Culture: Newspapers, Celebrations, Voting, and Democratization in the Early Republic, in THE
REVOLUTION OF 1800: DEMOCRACY, RACE, AND THE NEW REPUBLIC 138 (James Horn et
al. eds., 2002) (“Where colonial printers had usually at least paid lip service to the
ideal of giving all viewpoints equal access, the new journals tended to be or quickly
became committed, admitted partisans.”).
305. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 396.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 400; FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 355–56.
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right to free speech. The first flash point between the Madisonian
and Federalist views of political speech arose when dozens of antiFederalist clubs known as Democratic-Republican Societies took root
across the country in the early 1790s.309 Inspired by Freneau’s
National Gazette as well as by revolutionary groups in France, the
Democratic-Republican Societies both galvanized and organized the
Washington Administration’s critics.310 As the historian Matthew
Schoenbachler has explained, the societies served “as the first media of
organized popular political dissent in the new republic.”311 In pamphlets
and handbills, the societies opposed Hamilton’s financial program,
criticized President Washington’s concentration of executive power, and
condemned the social elitism of the Federalists in general.312 The societies
even accused the Federalists of subverting American liberty, going so far as
to accuse Washington and Hamilton of seeking to install in America “the
corrupt policy of trans-Atlantic monarchy and aristocracy.”313
Ironically, the leaders of the Democratic-Republican Societies
tended to be fairly wealthy themselves, at least by the standards of the
1790s.314 The officers of the clubs typically consisted of merchants,
lawyers, slaveowners, professionals, and skilled artisans, a group that
exercised considerable economic power in their own right.315 The relative
309. WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 40–41; Matthew Schoenbachler, Republicanism in
the Age of Democratic Revolution: The Democratic-Republican Societies of the 1790s, 18 J.
EARLY REPUBLIC 237, 237–38 (1998).
310. THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN SOCIETIES, 1790–1800: A DOCUMENTARY
SOURCEBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONS, DECLARATIONS, ADDRESSES, RESOLUTIONS, AND TOASTS
3–4 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1976) (“[G]roups of ‘banditti-like’ people were reading
Philip Freneau’s National Gazette and discussing its advice to organize into societies
and voice their opposition to Federalist policies. . . . Jacobin societies of France were
their immediate forerunners.”); see WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 53; Schoenbachler,
supra note 309, at 239.
311. Schoenbachler, supra note 309, at 239.
312. WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 54–55; Schoenbachler, supra note 309, at 245–46, 252.
313. Schoenbachler, supra note 309, at 245; see WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 54–55.
314. Albrecht Koschnik, The Democratic Societies of Philadelphia and the Limits of the
American Public Sphere, Circa 1793–1795, 58 WM. & MARY Q. 615, 620 (2001)
(“Initiation fees, quarterly dues, and the ticket prices for celebrations put
membership out of reach of the urban poor. Aspiring or prosperous merchants,
professionals, and artisans represented about two-thirds of the membership (245 out
of 306 men can be identified).”).
315. Id. at 620; see also THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN SOCIETIES, supra note 310, at 9
(“We can conclude that the Democratic-Republican societies represented a coalition
of merchants, political leaders, landowners, slaveowners, professionals, small
tradesmen, mechanics, seamen, and laborers and that within this coalition,
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prosperity of the societies’ leaders enabled them to pay for printing and
circulating handbills and political tracts. But the leaders generally came
from the ranks of the upwardly mobile, and thus often found themselves
socially excluded from the Federalists’ old money circles.316
The ferocity of the societies’ public accusations alarmed the
Federalists.317 The Federalists viewed the societies as an example of
“democratic excess” and believed that opposition to the
Administration’s policies should be confined to the ballot box and
not expressed in public criticism.318 Accordingly, many Federalists
challenged the “very idea of organized popular criticism” of the
Washington Administration.319 The Federalists simply did not believe
that the societies’ public critique of the government represented a
legitimate form of political discourse.320
The controversy over the societies anticipated a growing Federalist
hostility to opposition speech. The Federalists particularly objected to
the fact that the societies’ alliance with Republican newspaper editors
enabled the societies to reach a wide audience, which the Federalists
claimed made the societies disproportionately and unfairly influential
with the public.321 Whereas the societies viewed their activities as “an
emphatic affirmation of the popular right to unrestricted speech and
association,” the Federalists viewed them as having too prominent of
a place on the public stage.322 The Federalist critique of the DemocraticRepublican Societies bore more than a passing resemblance to the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Austin two centuries later.323 In upholding

mechanics supplied the bulk of the membership while the political leaders and
professionals supplied the bulk of the leadership.”).
316. Koschnik, supra note 314, at 620.
317. See Schoenbachler, supra note 309, at 245.
318. Id. at 254 (“In the face of the societies’ assault upon elitist politics and social
privilege, the Federalists insisted that democracy was a process, not an end of
government; popular participation began and ended on election day.”).
319. Id. at 253, 254 (“Indeed, the mere existence of such popular organizations
flew headlong into Federalist notions of a strong central government at a healthy
remove from the people at large.”).
320. See id. at 256 (“In the face of Federalist denials of the legitimacy of political
opposition arising outside of government circles, the societies portrayed themselves
as defenders of the revolutionary heritage.”).
321. See Koschnik, supra note 314, at 630 (“But the Federalists considered the societies’
extensive recourse to newspapers a blatant attempt to misrepresent public opinion and
worried about the influence the societies’ shrewd use of print might give them.”).
322. Id. at 623, 630.
323. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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Michigan’s ban on corporate independent expenditures, the Supreme
Court asserted that the government could impose regulations designed
to ensure that “expenditures reflect actual public support for the
political ideas espoused by corporations.”324 Likewise, the Federalists
insisted that editorials in the Republican newspapers did not reflect
actual public support for the positions the Republicans espoused, and
thus should be suppressed.325
When John Adams became president in 1797, his Administration
took a confrontational approach to the Republican newspapers. His
wife, Abigail Adams, supported a crackdown on the “wicked and
base” criticism emanating from the “vile incendiaries” of the
Republican press.326 Federalist animosity toward Republican
newspapers became increasingly aggressive. In one case, a Federalist
mob attacked the building that housed the Philadelphia Aurora, a
Republican newspaper edited by Benjamin Franklin’s grandson,
Benjamin Franklin Bache.327 Abigail Adams had no sympathy for
Bache, complaining that in “any other country, Bache and all his
papers would have been seized long ago.”328 When the twenty-nineyear-old Bache died shortly thereafter of yellow fever, President
Adams condemned the young man posthumously as a “malicious
libeller.”329 The President took satisfaction from the fact that “the
yellow fever arrested him in his detestable career.”330
When the United States entered into an undeclared naval war
against France in 1798, the Federalists used the crisis as a pretext to
silence their Republican opponents once and for all.331 In July 1798,
Congress passed the Sedition Act,332 which criminalized “any false,
scandalous, and malicious” statement about federal officeholders or
any statement intended to “excite against them . . . the hatred of the
good people of the United States.”333 The Sedition Act represented a
324. Id. at 660.
325. See Koschnik, supra note 314, at 630 (“Describing their opponents as
unrepresentative was a common Federalist tactic.”).
326. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 571; MCCULLOUGH, note 298, at 506.
327. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 570.
328. Id. at 571.
329. Id. at 570–71.
330. Id. at 571.
331. See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 414; MCCULLOUGH, note 298, at 505–06
(“[T]he real and obvious intent was to stifle the Republican press.”).
332. 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
333. Id. § 2.
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direct attack on press freedom and the right to criticize the
government. One member of the Federalist majority in Congress
freely admitted that the new law was intended to ensure that
American newspapers would only publish “pure sentiments and good
principles,” i.e., Federalist principles.334 The bottom line was the
Federalists did not believe in the value of a free, full, and open public
discourse. As the President’s personal secretary explained, “the
liberty of the press . . . is a powerful engine for the subversion of all
government—a mighty lever, sufficient . . . to overthrow the social
order of the world.”335 To underscore the stakes as the Federalists saw
them, President Adams signed the Sedition bill into law on July 14,
1798, the ninth anniversary of the storming of the Bastille, the
uprising that triggered the French Revolution.336
The Federalists soon made good on their threats.337 They pursued
criminal cases for seditious libel against editors of five of the six most
important Republican newspapers.338 The power of criminal
prosecutions became a campaign weapon for Federalists to wield in
the presidential election.339 Under the Sedition Act, Federalist
prosecutors brought criminal charges against Republican editors in
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and New York, all states that the parties
viewed as crucial to the outcome of the 1800 election.340 With good
reason, Madison and Jefferson feared that under the pretense of
suppressing seditious libel the Federalists would destroy the
Republican Party.341 Alarmed by the rising threat of repression,
Jefferson warned Madison that “[i]f these papers fall, . . .
Republicanism will be entirely browbeaten.”342 Indeed, as the
historians Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick observed, “the freedom
of the Republican press to pass judgment on officeholders—openly,
aggressively, even abusively—was essential to the party’s survival.”343

334. FERLING, supra note 298, at 365.
335. Id. at 366.
336. Id. at 365.
337. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 574–75; FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 431–32.
338. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 575.
339. See MERRILL D. PETERSON, ADAMS AND JEFFERSON: A REVOLUTIONARY DIALOGUE
81 (1976) (“Most of the prosecutions were targeted for political effect.”).
340. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 431–32.
341. Id. at 415.
342. Id.
343. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 164, at 701.
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Even members of Congress were not safe from the Federalist
onslaught. In one of the most dramatic episodes of the Administration’s
crackdown on dissent, Federalist prosecutors brought criminal charges
under the Sedition Act against Republican Congressman Matthew Lyon
of Vermont.344 The Federalists charged Lyon with committing sedition
when the newspaper he owned accused President Adams of having an
“unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish
avarice.”345 Lyon was convicted, fined $1000, and sentenced to four
months in prison.346 But the Federalists’ intimidation tactics did not
cow Lyon’s Republican supporters. He campaigned for re-election
from his jail cell and won by the largest margin of his career.347
The ballot box proved critical to ending the Sedition Act. The
Republicans’ victories in the 1800 election brought the seditious libel
prosecutions to an end. The Sedition Act expired on March 3, 1801,
the day before Jefferson’s inauguration.348 President Jefferson
ordered the release of those serving their sentences and pardoned a
number of the editors convicted under the Act.349 Ironically, despite
the Federalists’ efforts to silence them, Republican newspapers
played a decisive role in the election’s outcome.350 As the historian
Jeffrey Pasley observed, “In the aftermath of the 1800 election,
Federalists and Republicans alike blamed or credited the nationwide
network of Republican newspapers for Jefferson’s triumph.”351
After Jefferson’s election, Republicans redoubled their efforts to
build a partisan newspaper empire,352 creating in the process a
political communications network that operated much like modern
PACs. Party officials donated money to fund Republican newspapers
and reported their progress to President Jefferson.353 Prior to the
344. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 421.
345. Id.
346. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 164, at 710; FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 421.
347. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 164, at 711.
348. SMITH, supra note 210, at 21.
349. MEACHAM, supra note 232, at 357; SMITH, supra note 210, at 21.
350. Pasley, supra note 304, at 136.
351. Id.
352. See NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS IN POWER: PARTY
OPERATIONS, 1801–1809, at 236–38 (1963) (“Fully conscious of the power of public
opinion and the influence of the press in molding popular sentiment, Republican party
strategists were constantly alert to the problems and the uses of the press . . . . When
Republicans came to power in 1801, party leaders appeared to regard the need for more
Republican presses as one of the greatest demands of the party.”).
353. Id. at 239, 243.
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1808 election, for example, Attorney General Levi Lincoln assured
Jefferson that individual Republican leaders in Massachusetts had
donated $50 to $100 each to establish and maintain a Republican
paper in Worcester.354 Likewise, Republican supporters in Kentucky
boasted to Senator John Breckinridge that “[a] small number of
persons have united, and at a great expense, procured a new press
and types, and hired, upon a liberal salary, an Editor and a
Printer.”355 In what amounted to de facto campaign fundraising
appeals, Republicans leaders urged supporters to provide financial
support to their partisan newspapers.356 In 1808, a Republican
circular in New York called on party members “to extend their
patronage by liberal subscriptions and payments for papers. Let every
Republican make it a matter of principle and honor to pay his printer
when due, and it would greatly aid him in his resources.”357
One tactic Republicans developed under Jefferson was to distribute
their newspapers to voters for free.358 But the practice was ruinously
expensive for the newspapers.359 Accordingly, Republican leaders
implored their supporters to contribute money for the distribution of
free newspapers.360 For example, during James Madison’s successful
1808 campaign for president, a Massachusetts Republican newspaper
editorial urged fellow Republicans to “unite in forming A PATRIOTIC
FUND, to defray the charges of printing and distributing gratis,
handbills, pamphlets, and other papers.”361 The newspaper editor noted
that “[a] dollar a man from every one who could afford it, would be
amply sufficient.”362 In addition, President Jefferson directed
government printing contracts to Republican newspapers across the
country.363 Jefferson also once again personally contributed to
Republican newspapers, paying over $70 for fourteen subscriptions

354. Id. at 243.
355. Id. at 244.
356. Id. at 245.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 245–46.
359. Id. at 247.
360. Id. at 246.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. See id. at 248–49 (“The policy of rewarding Republican printers with federal
patronage . . . was followed by the administration. . . . Once inaugurated, the policy
of supporting Republican presses with printing patronage appears to have been
consistently applied throughout the Jeffersonian administration.”).
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during the 1804 campaign.364 By the end of his presidency, he
subscribed to thirty-three newspapers.365 He also subsidized Republican
printers by paying generously for their political pamphlets.366 In one
case, the President paid a New York Republican printer over $98 to print
campaign pamphlets and partisan newspapers.367 In another case, he
gave a Philadelphia Republican printer over $120 during the 1804
election.368 Yet, Jefferson always maintained a low opinion of the
information purveyed by newspapers. Writing privately in 1807, he
observed, “[n]othing can now be believed which is seen in a
newspaper. . . . [T]he man who never looks into a newspaper is better
informed than he who reads them . . . .”369
James Madison benefited from the partisan newspaper network
and the sophisticated political organization that the Republicans had
built in the early 1800s.370 Although a brilliant man, he was not a
good campaigner and did not enjoy the campaign trail.371 A small,
shy, and inconspicuous person, he struggled to connect with
strangers and never became a particularly effective public speaker.372
Madison was instead a party builder, working behind the scenes to
organize Republicans into a powerful partisan organization.373 In the
end, the Republican political communications network consisting of
newspapers, pamphlets, handbills, and party rallies more than
compensated for Madison’s personal shortcomings as a dull and
uncharismatic candidate. As Noble Cunningham observed, by 1808
Republicans had in place a system of “[e]ffective organization and

364. Id. at 253.
365. Id. at 253–54.
366. Id. at 255.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 270–71.
369. Id. at 264.
370. Id. at 305.
371. See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 310 (“In fact, Madison hated running for office. . . .”).
372. See id. at 445 (“Madison had conducted politics mostly in writing . . . .
[P]olitics was conducted face-to-face, often through social contact. That was not
Madison’s natural inclination.”); see, e.g., LYNNE CHENEY, JAMES MADISON: A LIFE
RECONSIDERED 3 (2014) (“[N]o one thought of him as an orator for the ages . . . .”);
KETCHAM, supra note 106, at 107–08 (“[H]e was thought awkward at formal
events. . . . He overcame his habitual shyness and reserve only when among people
he trusted. . . . He therefore seldom made a good first impression. . . .”); WILENTZ,
supra note 107, at 42 (describing Madison as short, “nervous, and achingly shy”).
373. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 29, at 258 (“[I]t was Madison who assumed the
Republican leadership.”).
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aggressive campaigning through newspapers, party literature, and
personal contacts [that] directly aimed at winning and maintaining
the support of the voter.”374 Thanks in no small part to the
Republicans’ complex—and expensive—campaign organization,
Madison won the presidency in 1808 and won reelection in 1812.375
Madison thus keenly understood the importance of freedom of
expression. The Adams Administration’s efforts to repress its opponents
profoundly shaped Madison’s view of the First Amendment. By the late
1790s, he believed that the First Amendment’s right of freedom of
expression categorically denied Congress the authority to punish
seditious libel.376 The Federalist claim that the First Amendment only
protected against prior restraint struck Madison as absurd.377 As he
explained, “It would seem a mockery that no law should be passed,
preventing publications from being made, but that laws might be passed
for punishing them in case they should be made.”378 Madison also
warned that censorship undermined the principle of democratic
elections because it suppressed “information and communication
among the people, which is indispensable to the just exercise of their
electoral rights.”379 The Federalist censorship campaign convinced
Madison that a broader, more protective view of free speech was
necessary.380 As the scholar Noah Feldman has explained, “it became
clear [to Madison] that free speech would be necessary to keep
public opinion informed,” as public opinion represented “the
ultimate guarantor of liberty.”381
Throughout his presidency, Madison remained true to his
principles and never acted to suppress the Federalist press, even
when doing so would have benefited him politically.382 In June 1812,
374. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 352, at 298.
375. See Irving Brant, Election of 1808, in 1 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS: 1789–1968, supra note 210, at 185–221; see also Norman K. Risjord,
Election of 1812, in 1 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS: 1789–1968 supra
note 210, at 249–72.
376. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 428.
377. Id. at 429.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. See DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE
REPUBLICAN LEGACY 12 (1989) (finding that even in the face of rampant obstruction
of his government’s policies and outright treason, Madison never abridged freedom
of speech or press).
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Congress declared war on Britain, a conflict that resulted from the Royal
Navy’s harassment of American shipping.383 The War of 1812 soon
escalated into a major conflict that lasted until February 1815.384 The war
resulted in the deaths of several thousand people and cost the
government over $158 million.385 Throughout the conflict, Madison’s
opponents subjected him to ferocious attacks and actively worked to
undermine his prosecution of the war.386 Federalist governors in New
England even refused to provide military assistance to the war effort.387
In August 1814, the British Army captured Washington D.C., forcing
President Madison to flee the White House in a humiliating retreat.388
Opposition to the war became so intense that in December 1814
Federalist leaders from the New England states convened a regional
conference in Hartford, Connecticut.389 Some observers feared the
Hartford convention would ultimately lead to the secession of the New
England states from the Union.390
President Madison viewed the Federalist obstruction of his war policies
as treasonous. In a letter to Jefferson, Madison wrote that “the seditious
opposition in Massachusetts and Connecticut, with the intrigues elsewhere
insidiously co-operating with it, have so clogged the wheels of the war that I
fear the campaign will not accomplish the object of it.”391 A visitor to the
White House found the President “miserably shattered and woe-begone”
with “[h]is mind . . . full of the New England sedition.”392 In a private letter,
Madison accused the antiwar Federalists of providing “inducement” to the
British to persevere in the war.393 A Republican newspaper editor even
warned the President that the antiwar Federalists threatened to provoke “all
the horrors of civil war, anarchy, and probably terminate in despotism.”394
383. See DONALD R. HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812: A FORGOTTEN CONFLICT 26 (1989) (“War
appealed to Republicans because it offered the prospect of winning diplomatic
concessions from the British, of forcing them to give up the Orders in Council and
impressment and perhaps modify their other maritime practices as well.”).
384. Id. at 301.
385. Id. at 302–03.
386. See MCCOY, supra note 382, at 12 (observing that “few Presidents have been
subjected to so much personal invective and abuse” as Madison during the War of 1812).
387. KETCHAM, supra note 106, at 537.
388. Id. at 578–79; HICKEY, supra note 383, at 198–99.
389. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 598.
390. Id. at 598–99.
391. KETCHAM, supra note 106, at 537.
392. Id. at 592.
393. Id. at 593.
394. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 598.

2020]

MADISON, CITIZENS UNITED, AND THE CONSTITUTION

1537

But Madison’s commitment to free expression never wavered. Despite
“countless cases of outright treason” in New England, Madison refused
to silence his enemies.395 As the historian Harry Coles observed of
Madison, “Though the provocation was extreme, he never suggested
measures abridging freedom of speech or press.”396 President Madison
did not even take steps to prevent the Hartford convention from
discussing disunion or advocating peace with Britain.397 As Noah
Feldman has emphasized, “It is essentially impossible to imagine any
subsequent wartime president—all of whom, without exception,
engaged in at least some attempts to suppress opposition—allowing
the Hartford convention to go forward.”398
There is no regulatory interest more compelling for the government
than national security. In Federalist No. 23, Alexander Hamilton
identified the defense of the nation as the federal government’s foremost
duty.399 The Supreme Court takes the same view. As the justices observed
in a 1980 case, “[i]t is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”400
But President Madison believed that the Constitutional right to
free speech took precedence, even over the government’s compelling
interest in national security. Accordingly, during the darkest days of
the war when the capital itself fell into the hands of a foreign invader,
Madison took no action to suppress the Federalists’ “treasonous”
statements. In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority
that “[i]f the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress
from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply

395. See MCCOY, supra note 382, at 12, 14 (observing that Madison “never hinted at
measures abridging freedom of speech or press, even in the face of rampant
obstruction of his government’s policies and countless cases of outright treason in
the ‘eastern states’ of New England. . . . Less than two years after the end of ‘Mr.
Madison’s War,’ one of his admirers proudly noted that not only a powerful foreign
enemy, but violent domestic opposition as well, had been ‘withstood without one
trial for treason, or even one prosecution for libel.’”).
396. HARRY L. COLES, THE WAR OF 1812, at 257 (1965).
397. See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 599 (finding that Madison instead approached
the Convention with an attitude of “calm and philosophical tranquility”).
398. Id.
399. THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The principal purposes to be
answered by union are these: The common defense of the members; the preservation of
the public peace as well against internal convulsions as external attacks . . . .”).
400. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State,
378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).
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engaging in political speech.”401 During the War of 1812, Madison’s
tolerant approach to disloyal Federalists reflected precisely Kennedy’s
view. The Sedition Act convinced Madison that the broadest possible
protections should be extended to citizens engaged in political speech.402
Even a foreign invasion did not shake his commitment to free speech.
CONCLUSION
As a young man, James Madison might have agreed with the critics
of the Citizens United decision. His refusal to buy alcohol for voters in
1777 reflected his Republican principles, which viewed the role of
money in politics through a lens of distrust. But as a politician, he
became a pragmatist and a realist.403 As Noah Feldman has put it,
Madison learned that he had “to use the tools of politics to achieve”
his ideals and principles.404 Above all, Madison recognized that to
realize his policy goals, he had to persuade the public to support his
partisan and political agenda.405
The threat posed by corruption was not lost on James Madison. He
feared the concentration of wealth that Hamilton’s financial
programs would produce. But Madison did not attempt to ban or
otherwise restrict the financial resources that Hamilton used to fund
the Federalist Party’s political communications. Instead, Madison and
Jefferson sought to defeat the Hamiltonian program at the ballot
box. To that end, Madison joined with Jefferson in forming the
Republican Party, which depended on the use of money to rally
supporters and win over the electorate. Jefferson urged Republican
leaders to make financial contributions to the partisan cause, and he
and Madison welcomed the support of wealthy individuals like John
Swanwick. The party Madison and Jefferson cofounded developed
innovative electioneering tactics that dramatically increased the cost
of campaigns. The phenomenon of soaring campaign costs thus
began with James Madison himself. Yet, during his long career in

401. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010).
402. See FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 599 (writing that Madison “would not violate
the principles of liberty to save liberty itself”).
403. Id. at 285, 370 (remarking that Madison emerged “as an increasingly adept,
realistic politician” and noting that as a politician Madison “had become increasingly
pragmatic and increasingly partisan”).
404. Id. at 314.
405. Id. at 285 (“[H]e was learning how to shape and respond to public opinion.
The skill would be increasingly necessary in the difficult years that lay ahead.”).
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office, Madison gave no indication that he thought that campaign
contributions or expenditures constituted a form of corruption that
could be banned or restricted under the Constitution.
Above all, Madison viewed the Constitutional right to free
expression in sweeping terms. During the War of 1812, he feared that
Federalist antiwar rhetoric threatened the survival of the United
States. Nevertheless, despite the compelling national security interest in
silencing disloyal Federalists, President Madison took a strongly prospeech position, even though it came at his own political detriment.
Equally important, Madison did not believe that a principled distinction
could be drawn between business speakers on the one hand, and media
speakers on the other. His political experience taught him that
ideological biases and business interests influenced every newspaper.
Accordingly, his support for a broad and sweeping freedom of
expression extended to all speakers, including politicians, business
leaders, journalists, voters, and ordinary citizens alike.
In his majority opinion in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy observed
that “[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means
to hold officials accountable to the people.”406 James Madison devoted his
entire career to that principle. The fractious world of practical politics
taught him that more political speech was better than less.

406. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339.

